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Using the most comprehensive source of commercially available data on the US National Market
System, we analyze all quotes and trades associated with Dow 30 stocks in calendar year 2016 from
the vantage point of a single and fixed frame of reference. We find that inefficiencies created in part by
the fragmentation of the equity marketplace are relatively common and persist for longer than what
physical constraints may suggest. Information feeds reported different prices for the same equity
more than 120 million times, with almost 64 million dislocation segments featuring meaningfully
longer duration and higher magnitude. During this period, roughly 22% of all trades occurred while
the SIP and aggregated direct feeds were dislocated. The current market configuration resulted in
a realized opportunity cost totaling over $160 million, a conservative estimate that does not take
into account intra-day offsetting events.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Dow Jones Industrial Average, colloquially known
as the Dow 30, is a group of 30 equity securities (stocks)
selected by S&P Dow Jones Indices that is intended to
reflect a broad cross-segment of the US economy (all
industries except for utilities and transportation) [1].
The Dow 30 is one of the best known indices in the
US and is broadly used as a barometer of the econo-
my. Thus, while the group of securities that composes
the Dow 30 is in some sense an arbitrary collection, it
derives economic import from its ascribed characteris-
tics. We study the behavior of these securities as trad-
ed in modern US equity markets, known as the Nation-
al Market System (NMS). The NMS is comprised of 13
networked exchanges coupled by information feeds of dif-
ferential quality and subordinated to national regulation.
Adding another layer of complexity, the NMS supports
a diverse ecosystem of market participants, ranging from
small retail investors to institutional financial firms and
designated market makers.
We do not attempt to unravel and attribute the activ-
ity of each of these actors here; several others have
attempted to classify such activities with varying degrees
of success in diverse markets [2–4]. We take a first-
principles approach by compiling an exhaustive catalog
of every dislocation, defined as a nonzero pairwise differ-
ence between the prices displayed by the National Best
Bid and Offer (NBBO), as observed via the Securities
Information Processor (SIP) feed, and Direct Best Bid
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and Offer (DBBO), as observed via the consolidation of
all direct feeds.
The SIP and consolidation of all direct feeds are rep-
resentative of the displayed quotes from the national
exchanges (lit market). Additionally, we catalog every
trade that occurred in the NMS among the Dow 30
in calendar year 2016, allowing an investigation of the
relationship between trade execution and dislocations.
We compile a dataset of all trades that may lead to a
non-zero realized opportunity cost (ROC). We find that
dislocations—times during which best bids and offers
(BBO) reported on different information feeds observed
at the same time from the point of view of a unified
observer differ—and differing trades—trades that occur
during dislocations—occur frequently. We measure more
than 120 million dislocation segments, events derived
from dislocations between the NBBO and DBBO, in the
Dow 30 in 2016, summary statistics of which are dis-
played in Table I. Approximately 65 million of those dis-
location segments are what we term actionable, meaning
that we estimate that there exists a nontrivial likelihood
that an appropriately equipped market participant could
realize arbitrage profits due to the existence of such a dis-
location segment. (We discuss actionability in detail in
Sec. III B and the role that potential arbitrageurs play in
the functioning of the NMS in Sec. VII.) Market partici-
pants incurred an estimated $160 million USD in oppor-
tunity cost due to information asymmetry between the
SIP and direct feed among the Dow 30 in 2016. We cal-
culate the ROC using the NBBO price as the baseline.
Deviations from this price contribute to the ROC with
positive sign if the direct feed displays a worse price than
the SIP, or with negative sign if the direct feed displays
a better price than the SIP (from the perspective of a
liquidity demanding market participant).
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1 Total Opportunity Cost $160,213,922.95
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $122,081,126.40
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $38,132,796.55
4 Trades 392,101,579
5 Differing Trades 87,432,231
6 Traded Value $3,858,963,034,003.48
7 Differing Traded Value $900,535,924,961.72
8 Fraction of differing trades 0.2230
9 Fraction of differing notional 0.2334
10 Ratio of (9) over (8) 1.0465
TABLE I. The SIP feed consistently displayed worse prices than the aggregate direct feed for liquidity demanding market
participants during periods of dislocation, with a $84 million net difference in opportunity cost. Statistics 8 - 10 indicate
that trades occurring during dislocations involve approximately 5% more value per trade on average than those that occur
while feeds are synchronized. The values reported above are sums of daily observations, except for statistics 8 - 10, and are
conservative estimates of the true, unobserved quantities since positive (favoring the SIP) and negative (favoring the direct
feeds) ROC can cancel in summary calculations.
To characterize these phenomena, we use a publicly
available dataset that features the most comprehensive
view of the NMS (see Sec. III C below) and is effective-
ly identical to that used by the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s (SEC) Market Information Data Analyt-
ics System (MIDAS). In addition to its comprehensive
nature, this data was collected from the viewpoint of a
unified observer: a single and fixed frame of reference co-
located from within the Nasdaq data center in Carteret,
N.J. We are unaware of any other source of public infor-
mation (i.e., dataset available for purchase) or private
information (e.g., available only to government agencies)
that is collected using the viewpoint of a single, unified
observer.
We demonstrate that the topological configuration of
the NMS entails endogenous inefficiency. The fractured
nature of the auction mechanism, continuous double auc-
tion operating on 13 heterogeneous exchanges and at
least 35 Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs) [5], is a
consistent generator of dislocations and opportunity cost
realized by market participants.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Theory of market efficiency
The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) as proposed
by Fama [6] has left an indelible mark upon the theory
of financial markets. Analysis of transaction data from
the late 1960s and early 1970s strongly suggested that
individual equity prices, and thus equity markets, fully
incorporated all relevant publicly available information
- the typical definition of market efficiency. A stronger
version of the EMH proposes the incorporation of private
information as well, via insider trading and other mech-
anisms. Previous studies have identified exceptions to
this hypothesis [7], such as price characteristics of equi-
ties in emerging markets [8], the existence of momen-
tum in the trajectories of equity prices [9], and specu-
lative asset bubbles. Recent work by Fama and French
has demonstrated that the EMH remains largely valid
[9] when price time series are examined at timescales of
at least 20 minutes and over a sufficiently long period of
time. However, the NMS operates at speeds far beyond
that of human cognition [10] and consists of fragmented
exchanges [11] that may display different prices to the
market. More permissive theories on market efficiency,
such as the Adaptive Markets Hypothesis [12], allow for
the existence of phenomena such as dislocations due to
reaction delays, faulty heuristics, and information asym-
metry [13]. In line with this, the Grossman-Stiglitz para-
dox [14] claims that markets cannot be perfectly efficient
in reality, since market participants would have no incen-
tive to obtain additional information. If market par-
ticipants do not have an incentive to obtain additional
information, then there is no mechanism by which mar-
ket efficiency can improve. The proposition that markets
are not perfectly efficient is supported by recent research.
O’Hara [11], Bloomfeld [15], Budish [16], and others pro-
vide evidence that well-informed traders are able to con-
sistently beat market returns as a result of both struc-
tural advantages and the actions of less-informed traders,
so called noise traders” [17]. This compendium of results
points to a synthesis of the competing viewpoints of mar-
ket efficiency. Specifically, that financial markets do seem
to eventually incorporate all publicly available informa-
tion, but deviations can occur at fine timescales due to
market fragmentation and information asymmetries.
B. Empirical studies of market dislocations
Since the speed of information propagation is bounded
above by the speed of light in a vacuum, it is not possi-
ble for information to propagate instantaneously across
a fragmented market with spatially separated match-
ing engines, such as the NMS. These physically-imposed
information propagation delays lead us to expect some
decoupling of BBOs across both matching engines and
information feeds. Such divergences were found between
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quotes on NYSE and regional exchanges as long ago as
the early 1990s [18], in NYSE securities writ large [19], in
Dow 30 securities in particular [20], between NASDAQ
broker-dealers and ATSs as recently as 2008 [21, 22], and
in NASDAQ listed securities as recently as 2012 [23]. U.S.
equities markets have changed substantially in the inter-
vening years, hence the motivation for our research. It is
a priori unclear to what extent dislocations should per-
sist within the NMS beyond the round-trip time of com-
munication via fiber-optic cable. A first-pass analysis of
latencies between matching engines could conclude that,
since information traveling at the theoretical speed of
light between Mahwah and Secaucus would take approx-
imately 372 µs to make a round trip between those loca-
tions, then dislocations of this length might be relative-
ly common. However, a light-speed round trip between
Secaucus and Mahwah takes approximately 230 µs and
between Secaucus and Carteret takes approximately 174
µs. Enterprising agents at Secaucus could rectify the dif-
ferences in quotes between Mahwah and Carteret without
direct interaction between agents in Carteret and agents
in Mahwah.
Several other authors have considered the questions
of calculating and quantifying the occurrence of dislo-
cations or dislocation-like measures. In the aggregate,
these studies conclude that price dislocations do not have
a substantial effect on retail investors, as these investors
tend to trade infrequently and in relatively small quanti-
ties, while conclusions differ on the effect of dislocations
on investors who trade more frequently and/or in larg-
er quantities, such as institutional investors and trading
firms. Ding, Hanna, and Hendershot (DHH) [23] investi-
gate dislocations between the SIP NBBO and a synthetic
BBO created using direct feed data. Their study focuses
on a smaller sample, 24 securities over 16 trading days,
using data collected by an observer at Secaucus, rather
than Carteret, and does not incorporate activity from the
NYSE exchanges. They found that dislocations occur
multiple times per second and tend to last between one
and two milliseconds. In addition, DHH find that dislo-
cations are associated with higher prices, volatility, and
trading volume. Bartlett and McCrary [24] also attempt-
ed to quantify the frequency and magnitude of disloca-
tions. However, Bartlett and McCrary did not use direct
feed data, so the existence of dislocations was estimated
using only Securities Information Processor (SIP) data,
making it difficult to directly align their results to those
presented here. A study by the TABB Group of trade
execution quality on midpoint orders in ATSs also not-
ed the existence of latency between the SIP and direct
data feeds, as well as the existence of intra-direct feed
latency, due to differences in exchange and ATS software
and other technical capabilities [25]. Wah [26] calculated
the potential arbitrage opportunities generated by laten-
cy arbitrage on the S&P 500 in 2016 using data from the
SEC’s MIDAS platform [27]. Wah’s study is of particular
interest as it is the only other study of which we are aware
that has used comprehensive data. Though similar in this
respect, the quantities estimated in Wah’s study differ
substantially from those considered here. Wah located
time intervals during which the highest buy price on one
exchange was higher than the lowest sell price on anoth-
er exchange, termed a “latency arbitrage opportunity”
in that work, and examined the potential profit to be
made by an infinitely-fast arbitrageur taking advantage
of these price discrepancies. This idealized arbitrageur
could have captured an estimated $3.03B USD in laten-
cy arbitrage among S&P 500 tickers during 2014, which
is on the same order of magnitude (on a per-ticker basis)
as our approximately $160M USD in realized opportunity
cost among Dow 30 tickers during calendar year 2016.
Other authors have analyzed the effect of high-
frequency trading (HFT) on market microstructure,
which is at least tangentially related to our current work
due to its reliance on low-latency, granular timescale
data and phenomena. O’Hara [11] provides a high-level
overview of the modern-day equity market and in doing
so outlines the possibility of dislocation segments arising
from differential information speed. Angel [28, 29] claims
that price dislocations are relatively rare occurrences,
while Carrion [30] provides evidence of high-frequency
trading strategies’ effectiveness in modern-day equity
markets via successful, intra-day market timing. Budish
[16] notes that high-frequency trading firms successfully
perform statistical arbitrage (e.g., pairs trading) in the
equities market, and ties this phenomenon to the con-
tinuous double auction mechanism that is omnipresent
in the current market structure. Menkveld [31] analyzed
the role of HFT in market making, finding that HFT
market making activity correlates negatively with long-
run price movements and providing some evidence that
HFT market making activity is associated with increas-
ingly energetic price fluctuations. Kirilenko [2] provided
an important classification of active trading strategies on
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange E-mini futures market,
which can be useful in creating statistical or agent-based
models of market phenomena. Mackintosh noted the
effects of both fragmented markets and differential infor-
mation on financial agents with varying motives, such
as high-frequency traders and long-term investors, in a
series of Knight Capital Group white papers [32]. These
papers provide at least three additional insights relevant
to our study. The first is a comparison of SIP and direct-
feed information, noting that “all data is stale” since,
regardless of the source (i.e., SIP or direct feed), rates
of data transmission are capped at the speed of light in
a vacuum as discussed above. The second is that the
SIP and the direct feeds are almost always synchronized.
That is, for U.S. large cap stocks like the Dow 30 in
2016, synchronization between the SIP and direct feeds
existed for 99.99% of the typical trading day. Stated
another way, Mackintosh observed dislocations between
quotes reported on the SIP and direct feeds for 0.01% of
the trading day, or a sum total of 23 seconds distributed
throughout the trading day. The third insight from the
Mackintosh papers relevant to our study reflects the sig-
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dashed lines are hypothesized
FIG. 1. The NMS (lit market and ATSs) as implied by the comprehensive market data. As we do not have the specifica-
tions of inter-market center communication mechanisms and have minimal knowledge of intra-market center communication
mechanisms, we simply classify information as having high latency, as the SIP and lagged information heading to the SIP
do, or low latency, as the information on the direct feeds does. Note the existence of the observer, located in Carteret NJ.
Without a single, fixed observer it is difficult to clock synchronization issues and introduces an unknown amount of noise into
measurements of dislocations and similar phenomena. Clock synchronization issues are avoided when using data collected from
a single point of presence since all messages may be timestamped by a single clock, controlled by the observer.
nificance of dislocations. Mackintosh observed that 30%
of daily value typically traded during these dislocations.
For a more comprehensive review of the literature on
high frequency trading and modern market microstruc-
ture more generally, we refer the reader to Goldstein et
al. [35] or Chordia et al. [36]. Arnuk and Saluzzi [37]
provide a monograph-level overview of the subject from
the viewpoint of industry practitioners.
III. DESCRIPTION OF EXCHANGE
NETWORK AND DATA FEEDS
Here we provide a brief overview of the National Mar-
ket System (NMS), including a description of infrastruc-
ture components and some varieties of market partici-
pants. In particular, we note the information asymmetry
between participants informed by the Securities Informa-
tion Processor and those informed by proprietary, direct
information feeds.
©2018 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited Case 18-3190
4
NMS Propagation Delay Estimates
Carteret-Mahwah Mahwah-Secaucus Carteret-Secaucus Secaucus-Weehawken
Straight-line Distance 34.55 mi 21.31 mi 16.22 mi 2.56 mi
55.6 km 34.3 km 26.1 km 4.12 km
Light speed, one-way 185.75 µs 114.57 µs 87.2 µs 13.76 µs
Light speed, two-way 371.5 µs 229.14 µs 174.4 µs 27.52 µs
Fiber, one-way 272.44 µs 168.07 µs 127.89 µs 20.19 µs
Fiber, two-way 544.88 µs 336.14 µs 255.78 µs 40.38 µs
Hybrid laser, one-way - - 94.5 µs -
Hybrid laser, two-way - - 189 µs -
TABLE II. The speed of light is approximated by 186, 000 mi/s (or 300, 000 km/s) and fiber propagation delays are assumed
to be 4.9µs/km [33]. These propagation delays form the basis for estimates of the duration required for a dislocation segment
to be considered actionable, though these figures do not account for any computing delays and thus are lower bounds for the
definition of actionable. Data center locations, distances between data centers, and one-way hybrid laser propagation delay are
obtained from Anova Technologies [34].
A. Market participants
There are, broadly speaking, three classes of agents
involved in the NMS: traders, of which there exist
essentially four sub-classes (retail investors, institution-
al investors, brokers, and market-makers) that are not
mutually exclusive; exchanges and ATSs, to which orders
are routed and on which trades are executed; and regula-
tors, which oversee trades and attempt to ensure that the
behavior of other market participants abides by market
regulation. See Appendix C for an overview of select reg-
ulations. We note that Kirilenko et al. claim the existence
of six classes of traders based on technical attributes of
their trading activity [2]. This classification was derived
from activity in the S&P 500 (E-mini) futures market,
not the equities market, but is an established classifica-
tion of trading activity. It is not possible to perform a
similar study in the NMS since agent attribution is not
publicly available [38]. Though the scope of this work
does not encompass an analysis of various classes of finan-
cial agents, we describe some important agent archetypes
in Appendix A.
B. Physical considerations
Contrary to its moniker, “Wall Street” is actually cen-
tered around northern New Jersey. The matching engines
for the three NYSE exchanges are located in Mahwah,
NJ, while the matching engines for the three NASDAQ
exchanges are located in Carteret, NJ. The other major
exchange families base their matching engines at the
Equinix data center, located in Secaucus, NJ, except for
IEX, which is based close to Secaucus in Weehawken, NJ.
The location of individual ATSs is generally not public
information. However, since there is a great incentive
for ATSs to be located close to data centers (see sections
II and VI), it is likely that many ATSs are located in
or near the data centers that house the NMS exchanges.
For example, Goldman Sachs’s Sigma X2 ATS has its
matching engine located at the Equinix data center in
Secaucus, NJ [39].
Since matching engines perform the work of matching
buyers with sellers in the NMS, we hereafter refer to the
locations of the exchanges by the geographic location of
their matching engine. For example, IEX has its point of
presence in Secaucus, but its matching engine is based in
Weehawken; we locate IEX at Weehawken.
This geographic decentralization has a profound effect
on the operation of the NMS. We calculate minimum
propagation delays between exchanges and are displayed
in Table II. In reality, the time for a message to travel
between exchanges will be strictly greater than these low-
er bounds, since light is slowed by transit through a fiber
optic cable, and further slowed by any curvature in the
cable itself. The two-way estimates in Table II give a low-
er bound on the minimum duration required for a disloca-
tion segment to be “actionable” and a more realistic esti-
mate derived by assuming propagation through a fiber
optic cable with a refractive index of 1.47 [33]. These
estimates do not account for computing delays, which
may occur at either end of the communication lines, in
order to avoid speculation. In practice such computing
delays will also have a material effect on which dislocation
segments are truly actionable and will depend heavily on
the performance of available computing hardware.
Connecting the exchanges are two basic types of data
feeds: SIP feeds, containing quotes, trades, limit-up
/ limit-down (LULD) messages, and other administra-
tive messages complied by the SIP; and direct data
feeds, which contain quotes, trades, order-flow messages
(add, modify, etc), and other administrative messages.
The direct data feeds operate on privately-funded and
installed fiber optic cables that may have differential
information transmission ability from the fiber optic
cables on which the SIP data feeds are transmitted.
Latency in propagation of information on the SIP is
also introduced by SIP-specific topology (SIP informa-
tion must travel from a matching engine to a SIP pro-
cessing node before being propagated from that node to
other matching engines) and computation occurring at
the SIP processing node. Due to the observed differential
latency between the direct data feeds and the SIP data
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FIG. 2. Diagram of two dislocation segments (DS). The inset plot shows the time series of best quotes that generate the DSs.
Where the time series diverge from the same value, a DS occurs. We have deliberately not placed units on t, ∆p, and p to
indicate that DSs can occur in any market in which there are differing information feeds, not just in the NMS, though we do
assume that these quantities are quantized. In the case of the NMS, we take t in units of µs and ∆p in units of $0.01. For the
sake of simplicity this figure only displays one side of a hypothetical book. Marker size in the inset plot is used only for visual
distinction.
FIG. 3. Panel A displays the distribution of dislocation segment (DS) durations. Panel B displays the distribution of DS
durations with a magnitude greater than $0.01. Both panels have a logged x-axis.
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feed and the heterogeneous distance between exchanges,
dislocation segments are created solely by the macro-level
organization of the market system. We note that in the
intervening years since data was collected for analysis,
the SIP has been upgraded substantially to lower laten-
cy arising from computation at SIP processing nodes.
Our understanding of the physical layout of the NMS
is depicted in Fig. 1 at a relatively high level. There are
three basic types of information flow within the NMS:
a. Direct feed information, which flows to anyone who
subscribes to it. Practically speaking, direct feed
information is not inexpensive (on the order of
$130, 000 USD per month, see Table VI for details)
and so is used primarily by exchanges, large finan-
cial firms, and ATSs. Direct feed information thus
flows to and from the exchanges (and the major
exchange participants). We hypothesize that direct
feed information also flows to ATSs, since they
require some type of price signal in order for the
market mechanism to function and may benefit
from low latency data. This was the case for at least
one major ATS, Goldman Sachs’s Sigma X2, as of
May 2019, so it is plausible that it is true for others
[39]. The direct feeds provide the fastest means by
which to acquire a price signal, and thus may pro-
vide the best economic value to traders dependent
on frequent information updates; this provides the
economic foundation for our hypothesis.
b. SIP information, which is considerably less expen-
sive than direct feed information and exists by regu-
latory mandate. However, market participants may
still subscribe to the SIP as a tool for use in arbi-
trage; see Section II for discussion of this possibili-
ty. Market participants that choose not to purchase
the direct feed data might also choose to purchase
the SIP data for use as a price signal and as a back-
up to the consolidated direct feeds. At least one
ATS, Goldman Sachs’s Sigma X2, uses SIP data
as a backup to direct feed data and combines both
data sources to construct their local BBO [39].
c. Lagged reporting data that is not yet collated by
the SIP. Regulation requires that exchanges report
all local quote and trade activity, and that ATSs
report all trade activity. This information is collect-
ed by the appropriate SIP tapes and then dissemi-
nated through the SIP data feeds. It is the respon-
sibility of the exchanges to report their quote and
trade information to the SIP, and of ATSs to report
their trade information to FINRA Trade Report-
ing Facilities (TRF). Thus, though this information
will be eventually visible to all subscribers to SIP
or direct feed data, it differs qualitatively from that
data due to its lagged nature.
For example, suppose a trade occurs at NYSE
MKT on a NASDAQ-listed security that updates
the NBBO for that security. Since this trade
occurs at Mahwah, it takes a non-negligible amount
of time for the information to propagate to SIP
Tape C, located in Carteret. However, traders
located at Mahwah have access to this information
more quickly, possibly allowing them an informa-
tion advantage over their Carteret-based competi-
tors.
C. Data
Our study utilizes all quotes and trades associate with
Dow 30 stocks that occurred in calendar year 2016 (2016-
01-01 through 2016-12-31), observed via the SIP and
Direct feeds from a single point of presence in Carteret,
NJ. This data is provided by Thesys Group Inc., former-
ly known as Tradeworx, who is the sole data provider
for the SEC’s MIDAS [27, 40]. MIDAS ingests more
than one billion records daily—order flow, quote updates,
and trade messages—from the direct feeds of all national
exchanges. These records represent the exhaustive set of
posted orders, quotes, order modifications, cancellations,
trades, and administrative messages issued by national
exchanges. Prior to awarding Thesys Group the MIDAS
contract [41], the SEC conducted a sole source selection
[42], thereby designating Thesys Group as the only cur-
rent authoritative source for NMS data.
In addition to being the authoritative data source for
the SEC’s MIDAS program, another significant attribute
of the Thesys data is that it is collected by a single
observer from a consistent location in the NMS (the Nas-
daq data center in Carteret, NJ) as depicted in Fig. 1.
The single observer not only allows the user to account for
the relativistic effects described above but also to direct-
ly observe dislocation segments and realized opportunity
cost instead of compiling estimates of these quantities as
has been done in previous studies. At the NASDAQ data
center, Thesys applies a new timestamp to each message
received, including messages originating from the SIP
feed or one of the direct feeds, that allows subscribers to
observe information flow through the NMS in the same
manner as a market participant located at the Carteret
data center. In our analysis we use this “Thesys times-
tamp” to synchronize information from disparate data
feeds and avoid issues that otherwise could arise from
clock synchronization errors and relativistic effects. Since
this timestamp is given at the time the data arrives at the
server from which the data is collected, any discrepancies
in the clocks at different exchanges, ATSs, and the SIP do
not affect our measurement procedures. This timestamp-
ing procedure is identical to that used in Ding, Hanna,
and Hendershott [23]. Ideally, we would have data from
four different unified observers—an observer located at
each data center—so that we could compile the differ-
ent states of the market that must exist depending on
physical location of observation, but we do not believe
that comprehensive consolidated data is available from
the point of view of observers located anywhere but at
Carteret, hence our selection of this location for observa-
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FIG. 4. Panel A displays the distribution of dislocation segment (DS) start times binned by minute. Panel B displays the
distribution of actionable DSs. Actionable DSs are those with a duration longer than 545µs. Panel C filters the actionable DSs
to only include those with a minimum magnitude > $0.01. Note that the distributions are heavily skewed right. A plurality of
actionable DSs occur in the half-hour following the opening bell when compared to any other half-hour during the day. There
is also a spike in the number of dislocation segments in the middle of the afternoon, which may be due to information events,
such as press releases from meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee.
tion.
IV. DISLOCATIONS
We provide a brief definition of a dislocation segment
as calculated and used in this work. Each dislocation
segment can be represented by a 4-tuple:
vn = (t
start
n , t
end
n , min ∆p, max ∆p). (1)
The maximum (resp. minimum) value of the dislocation
segment are simply the maximum (resp. minimum) dif-
ference in the prices that are generating the dislocation
segment over the time period [tstartn , t
end
n ). The time peri-
od [tstartn , t
end
n ) is determined by identifying a contiguous
period of time where ∆p > 0 or ∆p < 0. From the
above quantities the duration of the dislocation segment
can also be calculated. The quantity ∆p(t) is the differ-
ence in the price displayed by the information feeds at
time t as measured and timestamped by our observer in
Carteret. From the definitions of max ∆p and min ∆p
the reader will note that dislocation segments will tend
to feature min(|min ∆p|) ≥ $0.01, since the minimum
tick size in the NMS is set at one penny for securities
with a share price of at least $1.00. In collating disloca-
tion data, we record the maximum and minimum value
of each dislocation segment rather than a time-weighted
average of dislocation value or other statistic for the sake
of simplicity. In much of our analysis we take the abso-
lute values of the maximum and minimum values of each
dislocation segment as the fundamental object of study
as any dislocation, regardless of which feed is favored,
presents an opportunity for market inefficiency.
See Fig. 2 for a stylized depiction of two dislocation
segments, along with annotations denoting their recorded
attributes.
Based on the definition of dislocation segments given
above, and fully specified in Appendix B, we may iden-
tify the necessary and sufficient conditions for a dislo-
cation segment to occur. Specifically, the market state
must include two or more distinct trading locations, two
or more information feeds with differing latency, and a
price discrepancy. These all follow directly from elements
of the definition; such that a simple, null model configu-
ration of a single exchange with a single data feed cannot
support the existence of dislocation segments as specified
here.
V. REALIZED OPPORTUNITY COST
We used the following decision procedure to calculate
realized opportunity cost: for each trade that occurred in
the NMS we checked if a price discrepancy between the
SIP and consolidated direct feeds was present at the time
the trade executed, from the point of view of our observer
in Carteret, and counted each as a differing trade. If the
differing trade executed at a price displayed by the pre-
vailing NBBO then a price difference was calculated, i.e.
pSIP− pdirect if the liquidity-demanding order was a offer
and pdirect − pSIP if the liquidity-demanding order was
a bid, and a cost, termed the realized opportunity cost
(ROC), was assigned to the trade using the number of
shares multiplied by the price difference. Depth of book
was not taken into account in this calculation. The sum
total of all ROC occurrences over a day was calculated
and recorded. With this construction, positive opportu-
nity costs indicate an incentive for liquidity demanding
market participants to use the SIP feed while negative
opportunity costs indicate an incentive to use the aggre-
gated direct feeds. By ignoring the sign of the opportuni-
ty costs, and thus which feed is favored, an aggregate or
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Filter Statistic Duration Min. Value Max. Value Min. Mag. Mean Mag. Max. Mag.
None count 120, 355, 462
mean 0.073712 -0.0012 0.0013 0.0112 0.0124 0.0137
std 5.519033 0.1698 0.4815 0.0529 0.2581 0.5075
min 0.000000 -141.49 -63.21 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.000216 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.000624 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.001190 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 10,789.83 372.69 4,905.69 372.69 2,452.85 4,905.69
Duration > 545µs count 65, 073, 196
mean 0.136142 -0.0020 0.0022 0.0109 0.0130 0.0151
std 7.505197 0.2233 0.6511 0.0653 0.3474 0.6850
min 0.000546 -141.49 -63.21 0.01 0.01 0.01
25% 0.000751 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
50% 0.001103 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
75% 0.002391 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
max 10,789.83 372.69 4,905.69 372.69 2,452.85 4,905.69
Duration > 545µs count 2, 872, 734
& mean 0.387866 -0.0250 0.0267 0.0305 0.0564 0.0823
Min. Mag. > $0.01 std 29.566716 0.9046 1.0021 0.3102 0.7116 1.3115
min 0.000546 -141.49 -63.21 0.02 0.02 0.02
25% 0.000724 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
50% 0.001207 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
75% 0.004231 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03
max 10,789.83 372.69 593.43 372.69 372.84 593.43
TABLE III. Dislocation Segment (DS) attributes where the first section is unconditioned, the middle section is restricted to DSs
with a duration longer than 545µs, and the final section is restricted to DSs with a duration longer than 545µs and a minimum
magnitude greater than $0.01. Of the approximately 120 million DSs observed, more than 54% of them have a duration that
would allow them to be considered actionable, and about 2.4% of them are both actionable and feature a minimum magnitude
greater than $0.01. This makes the magnitude of the realized opportunity cost even more remarkable. Additionally, note that
observed durations of “0” are the result of DSs that begin and end within the same microsecond, the maximum precision used
for the majority of market data timestamps.
total realized opportunity cost is constructed. Intra-day
events can offset—e.g., a trade that resulted in ROC that
disadvantaged direct data users and a trade that result-
ed in ROC that disadvantaged SIP data users could both
occur on the same day, partially offsetting the total ROC
due to opposite signs. Precise definitions of quantities
described here are located in Appendix B.
As above, we provide a brief toy example of how real-
ized opportunity cost can arise and a description of its’
calculation. A minimal example involves two traders,
each of which is in the market to buy the security XYZ.
One trader places orders using the SIP NBO to determine
the appropriate limit price and the other places orders
using the best offer from a direct feed. If a trade for 100
shares of XYZ executes at $100.00 per share, the cur-
rent direct best offer, when the NBBO was a SIP quote
of $100.01 per share, a trader placing a bid informed by
the SIP could receive an execution that resulted in a real-
ized opportunity cost of $0.01 per share, or $1.00 in total.
Because this opportunity cost favored the direct feed, this
portion of ROC would be assigned a negative value. If,
during another trade on the same day, another trade for
100 shares of XYZ executes when the direct best offer
price is $101.02 and the SIP NBO price is $101.00 per
share, the trader who places orders informed exclusive-
ly by the direct feeds could have experienced a realized
opportunity cost of $0.02 per share, or $2.00 in total,
assuming that they may have been able to find counter-
parties at the SIP NBO. This ROC is assigned a positive
value because it favors the SIP feed. Summing these two
together produces a net ROC of $1.00, hence the conser-
vative nature of our estimates. If, instead, our calcula-
tion summed the absolute value of each ROC-generating
event, the figure above would instead be $3.00. A more
detailed example of ROC calculation from real trade data
is located in Appendix E.
VI. RESULTS
A. Dislocations and dislocation segments
We find that dislocations and dislocation segments
are widespread, from the point of view of our observ-
er in Carteret, and may have qualitative welfare effects
on NMS participants, particularly large investors or
investors that interact with the NMS directly on a fre-
quent basis. There were a total of 120,355,462 disloca-
tion segments among Dow 30 stocks in 2016. Now, lets
assume a uniform distribution of dislocations through-
out the trading day. On average, we therefore expect
120,355,462
252×6.5×602 ≈ 20.4 dislocation segments per second.
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When restricting our attention to what we term action-
able dislocation segments (those with a duration longer
than 545 µs), we find that there were 65,073,196 action-
able dislocation segments, or on average, 65,073,196252×6.5×602 ≈
11 actionable dislocation segments every second. Even
when inspecting actionable dislocation segments with a
minimum magnitude greater than 1 cent, we find that
there were 2,872,734 instances of these dislocation seg-
ments, or on average, 2,872,734252×6.5×602 ≈ 0.49 dislocation seg-
ments per second, or almost one large and actionable
dislocation segment every two seconds.
We focus much of our subsequent analysis on the dis-
location segment distribution conditioned on both dura-
tion (> 545µs) and magnitude (> $0.01) From an aca-
demic point of view, dislocations with a minimum magni-
tude greater than one cent are more interesting, since one
might expect many dislocations to feature a magnitude
that corresponds with the price quantization—minimum
tick size ($0.01 in this case). There are several aspects
of this conditional distribution that bear special notice.
First, the distribution of each attribute is exceptional-
ly heavy-tailed. In absolute value, the 75%-iles of the
minimum and maximum magnitude are three cents—but
the mean in absolute value of the minimum magnitude
(resp. maximum magnitude) is 3.05 (resp. 8.23) cents.
A similar phenomena is true for the duration distribu-
tion, displayed in Fig. 3, where the 75%-ile is 4231 µs,
while the mean is an astounding 0.389 seconds, almost
two orders of magnitude longer. The max magnitude,
min magnitude, and duration distributions are all high-
ly skewed, while the distributions of the maximum and
minimum magnitudes are nearly identical. Further sum-
mary statistics on dislocations with various conditioning
are displayed in Table III.
Fig. 4 shows the distribution of dislocation segments
modulo day, binned by minute. Intra-day dislocation
segment distributions are markedly nonuniform, with a
majority of the probability mass concentrated toward the
beginning of the trading day. There is also a notable
spike in the number of dislocation segments occurring in
mid-afternoon and at the very end of the trading day.
Additionally, there seems to be a decaying cyclic pat-
tern in the distribution, with spikes occurring with a 30
minute frequency.
We postulate that the mid-afternoon spike, which
occurs at approximately 2:00pm, is associated with meet-
ings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
These meetings release economically important informa-
tion such as decisions regarding federal rate changes and
economic forecasts, and their impact has been noted by
several market participants, including analysts at NYSE
[43, 44]. Note that the NYSE analysis of the impact of
FOMC meetings is based upon a quote volatility mea-
sure, which is conceptually quite similar to the disloca-
tions discussed in our work. Regarding the cyclic pattern,
it seems that most of this activity can be attributed to
the aggregated effect of seemingly random market events.
Investigating the data without aggregation reveals that
almost no days exhibit this cyclic behavior for DS occur-
rence, though there are many days that seem to have one
or more abnormal spikes in DS occurrence at seeming-
ly random times. During aggregation, these potentially
large spikes are not entirely smoothed out, leading to
the cyclic pattern observed in Fig. 4. Interested readers
may investigate the dislocation segment occurrence dis-
tributions without aggregation by using the interactive
application provided in our GitLab repository [45].
To further unpack the relationship between time of day,
length, and magnitude of dislocation segments, we creat-
ed a representation of dislocation segments modulo day
as an ordered network, termed a circle plot. Fig. 5 illus-
trates the construction of the circle plots from a few toy
examples. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 depict circle plots for AAPL
for an arbitrary day, whereas Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 depict
circle plots for AAPL for the entirety of 2016.
Circle plots are constructed using the following algo-
rithm. Starts and stops of dislocation segments at time
t (as measured and timestamped by our observer in
Carteret) are termed events v(t) and denoted by black
nodes. More than one event can occur at each time t; all
events are represented by the same node. Events vi(t)
and vj(s) where t < s are connected by an edge eij when
a dislocation segment starts at vi(t) and ends at vj(s). It
is not necessarily the case that dislocation segments start
and stop in order as seen above; for example consider two
dislocation segments, the first starting at vi, and the sec-
ond starting at vj . The first dislocation segment could
end at vk, and the second could end at v`. WhenN events
occur “out of order” in this way, we identify the events as
a single component (even though, as in the above exam-
ple, the component decomposes into two two-tuples of
events) and term it an N -component for reasons we state
below; the above example is a 4-component. Nodes are
plotted in rays that spread outward from the geometric
center of the plot in a modulo 10 relation. Edges between
nodes vi and vj are weighted according to the quantity∑
(vi,vj)
max(|∆pmax|, |∆pmin|), (2)
where the sum is taken over all events that started at
node vi and ended at node vj and ∆pmax and ∆pmin are
the largest positive (resp. smallest negative) change in
value that occurred during each event. Fig. 9 displays
the ordered network for AAPL aggregated (modulo day)
over the entire trading year. There is high event den-
sity near the beginning of the day and there is another
spike in density near noon-12:30 PM. This clustering can
make interpretation of the fine event structure difficult
to discern, so we conduct a re-normalization into event
space with a simple method: consecutive events vi(t) and
vj(s) are plotted in order, but at a uniform distance so
that the measure on the graph becomes a Stieltjes-type
instead of a Lebesgue-type measure. In other words, in
the case of the real time representation, an event rep-
resented by a node on a fixed but arbitrary circle of
the graph occurred at a multiple of 10µs from all oth-
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FIG. 5. A depiction of the injection mapping from an N -component in a ordered network to a tied positive random walk of
length N + 1. The injection is given by j outgoing edges ∼= j steps up and likewise k incoming edges ∼= k steps down. The
total number of steps up or down is given by xn+1 − xn = # of steps up + # of steps down. The top row displays a simple
2-component, where an equity begins a dislocation at time ti and ends it at time ti+1. The corresponding walk on the line
starts at zero, moves up a step, and then moves down. The second row displays a 4-component identical to that described in
the text of the article. This 4-component, which is separable into two disconnected pieces, demonstrates the geometric nature
of the ordered network. Since an ordering is imposed on the nodes, the crossing of the edges implies the staggered starts and
stops of the two dislocations.
er events represented by nodes on the ring; in the case
of the event-time representation, an event represented by
a node on a fixed but arbitrary circle of the graph and
another event represented by a node on the same cir-
cle are separated by an integer multiple of events that
occurred between them. Fig. 6 displays the ordered net-
work in this re-normalized space, where it is easier to see
that the usual behavior of dislocation segments is a regu-
lar cyclic, on-off (start-stop) pattern. However, there are
multiple deviations from this pattern—any component
other than a 2-component is structurally different from
a purely sequential pattern. In fact, there is an injection
from an N -component and a tied, non-negative sequence
{xn}Nn=0, x0 = xN+1 = 0, xn ≥ 0 for all n. This injec-
tion is defined by the relationships “start of k events ∼=
k steps up” and “end of k events ∼= k steps down”.
As a concrete example, the 4-component described
above maps to the sequence steps {1, 1,−1,−1}, with
values x0 = 0, x1 = 1, x2 = 2, x3 = 1, x4 = 0. Fig.
5 displays a toy example of the injection between N -
components in an ordered network and a tied positive
sequence, as outlined above.
When aggregated over all trading days, evidence of
persistent nontrivial structure in the event-space density
of N -tuples emerges. As stated above, Fig. 8 and Fig.
9 display the aggregate of events in AAPL modulo day.
Visualizations of all Dow 30 securities in this format are
at the authors’ webpage [46].
B. Realized opportunity cost
The large number of actionable dislocation segments
likely has a direct effect on the opportunity cost market
participants may incur by using one information source
over the other. The aggregate of this realized opportuni-
ty cost can be estimated by cataloging the quantity and
characteristics (average price difference, etc.) of differ-
ing trades. Table I summarizes many of these findings.
In the time period studied (01-01-2016 through 31-12-
2016) there were a total of 392,101,579 trades of stocks in
the Dow 30, with a traded value of $3,858,963,034,003.48
USD. Of those trades, we classified 87,432,231 trades, or
22.3% of the total number of trades, as differing trades,
defined as follows: if the trade is on the buy side, it is a
differing trade if the SIP bid is not equal to the direct bid;
if the trade is on the sell side, it is a differing trade if the
SIP offer is not equal to the direct offer. These differing
trades had a traded value of $900,535,924,961.72 USD,
or 23.34% of the total traded value. More optimal use of
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FIG. 6. Distribution of dislocation segments (DS) with minimum magnitude greater than $0.01 and duration longer than
545µs for AAPL on 2016-01-07 visualized with a time re-normalization procedure. Nodes are placed in rings modulo 10; nodes
zero through 9 are in the first ray from the origin, then the angle in the plot is incremented and nodes 10 through 19 are in
the second ray, etc. A link eij connects two nodes, vi and vj , if a dislocation segment starts at vi and stops at vj . This view
of the dislocation segment network preserves time ordering while defining a nonlinear transformation between uniform time
ordering, as shown below in Fig. 7, and uniform event-space ordering, as shown here. As noted in the text, it is not necessary
for only one dislocation segment to exist at the same point in time t. For example, there are many instances of new dislocation
segments starting while another is still ongoing—the first starts at vi and then another starts at vj and ends at vk, followed
by the first dislocation segment ending at v`. Irregular behavior such as this generates the banding of the edge distribution.
Interested readers may wish to have some more context for the selected date. For AAPL, 2016-01-07 ranked 8th out of 252
trading days when considering ROC. $106,990.23 in ROC was accumulated, which lies between the minimum of $2,773.35 and
the maximum of $138,331.08. This day of AAPL also ranked 15th when considering the number of DSs. A total of 108,843
occurred, falling between the minimum of 9,256 and the maximum of 188,656.
information presented by the SIP and direct feeds could
have saved market participants a total of $160,213,922.95
USD in ROC. This opportunity cost was distributed
unevenly, with traders informed by NBBO prices suffer-
ing $122,081,126.40 USD in ROC, while traders informed
by DBBO prices only accumulated $38,132,796.55 USD
in ROC. Fig. 11 displays the daily net opportunity cost
aggregated over all tickers in our sample, while Table V
displays realized opportunity cost summary statistics for
all tickers. Though our observer was located in Carteret
while many securities (all but four during 2016) in the
Dow 30 are listed on NYSE, located in Mahwah, consul-
tation with Table V demonstrates that mean ROC per
ticker does not differ significantly by listing venue (one-
way ANOVA: F (4, 20) = 1.35, p = 0.25; Kruskal-Wallis
H-test: H = 0.84, p = 0.35).
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FIG. 7. Dislocation segments in AAPL on 2016-01-07 without time re-normalization. The characteristic structure in the
occurrence of dislocations segments is clearly displayed, with the majority occurring near the beginning of the trading day.
Trades Traded Value Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ROC ROC/Share
mean 1,555,958.65 15,313,345,373.03 346,953.30 3,573,555,257.78 635,769.54 0.011804
std 463,558.93 3,891,299,900.31 146,677.85 1,234,882,079.43 655,911.15 0.008592
min 579,206 6,664,671,053.15 89,564 1,035,855,029.71 145,205.65 0.008848
25% 1,278,813.25 12,915,031,172.08 262,209 2,804,569,367.64 417,485.73 0.009613
50% 1,429,062 14,431,597,662.02 309,158 3,274,390,601.60 514,856.64 0.010154
75% 1,715,351.25 16,829,521,684.38 387,772 3,993,470,514.97 666,268.27 0.011213
max 3,596,006 30,999,914,293.66 1,073,029 9,428,952,387.10 7,817,684.58 0.098303
TABLE IV. Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost and related statistics for Dow 30 stocks, aggregated over the 252
trading days in 2016.
Fig. 10 provides further insight into the joint distri-
bution of total and differing trades. While we might a
priori expect that the ratio of total to differing trades
would remain roughly a fixed constant, we see that this
is not observed empirically.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Using the most comprehensive set of NMS data pub-
licly available, we have shown that market inefficiencies
in the form of dislocations and realized opportunity cost
were common in the Dow 30 in 2016 as measured by our
observer in the NASDAQ data center in Carteret, NJ.
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FIG. 8. Dislocation segments (DS) aggregated over an entire year (modulo trading day). Investigating structures at the
trading day timescale is of interest as this is likely the longest timescale over which HFT strategies are used. Here DSs are
plotted in event space, where density is uniform between events. Note the presence of irregular structure even here, evidence
of higher-order structure in the ordering of starts and stops of DSs.
We find that inefficiencies due to the physical fragmenta-
tion of the market are widespread, totaling over $160M
USD in realized opportunity cost and 2,872,734 disloca-
tions of magnitude > $0.01 and duration > 545 µs. These
figures correspond well with those reported in other bod-
ies of work [23, 26]. Additionally, we found that the
average trade that occurred during a dislocation moved
approximately 5% more value than the average trade that
occurred when the NBBO and DBBO were synchronized
(see Table I row 10). In the fifth Need for Speed report
[32], Mackintosh and Chen indicate that 29% of trad-
ed value executes within a small window around quote
changes, closely aligning with rows 8 and 9 from Table
I. This may indicate that market participants could be
more heavily impacted by the existence of dislocation
segments than previous analyses suggest.
Though our work is empirical, our results do have
implications for theoretical results on nuances of finan-
cial market efficiency. The discovery of systematically-
different prices as measured in geographically-distinct
locations that can be routinely observed by agents with
access to higher-speed information flows—and cannot be
routinely observed by agents without this access—has a
logical bearing on questions of distributional effects of
asymmetric information and market design. This fea-
ture of fragmented market structure can be viewed as a
modern-day example of the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox
[14]. Trading agents who are able to act at higher speeds
may be rewarded for their investment, effort, and risk-
taking behavior by executing on trading opportunities
that exist for very short time intervals. In fact, with-
out competition among traders to reduce processing time
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FIG. 9. Dislocation segments (DS) aggregated over an entire year (modulo trading day), as above, but not transformed to
event space. The high density of dislocation segments at the beginning of the trading day, near 12:10, and near 2:00 is readily
apparent.
and infrastructure providers to implement faster commu-
nications protocols and networking equipment, disloca-
tions and associated inefficiencies would likely be more
prevalent. Opportunity cost realized by market partic-
ipants (in the form of ROC as detailed above) is ulti-
mately attributable to the physically- and topologically-
fragmented nature of the NMS. Despite this fact, we
believe that the current market configuration offers many
benefits over alternative configurations, such as the null
model defined in Section IV. These results should not be
considered as evidence for or against a specific market
configuration since, as stated above, the observed phe-
nomena may incentivize the participation of certain kinds
of market actors.
We focused our attention on the Dow 30 during calen-
dar year 2016 in order to provide a strong, but tractable
baseline. Future work should investigate longer time
periods, larger groups of equities, and other exchange
traded products such as Exchange Traded Funds (ETF).
For example, an extension of the current work to larg-
er groups of equities, such as the S&P 500 or the Rus-
sell 3000 would provide greater context for how frag-
mentation effects different portions of the equities mar-
ket. While a time series analysis of dislocation segments
and realized opportunity cost series over several years
could provide useful information about how fragmenta-
tion effects have evolved due to changes in regulation,
technology, and market participant behavior.
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FIG. 10. Left: A bivariate empirical distribution function for total trades and number of differing trades. Right: The same
distribution, but with logged axes. We might expect a priori that they are related by a constant proportion and hence should
observe a fit log10 total trades = c+log10 differing trades, where c < 0. Though there is good evidence of this linear relationship,
we see there is a non-negligible area of higher total trades with markedly sub-linear scaling of differing trades.
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Appendix A: Market participants
1. Traders
The four broad classes of traders have different market
objectives, and thus generally have different mechanisms
for interacting with the market. Retail investors gen-
erally have a small amount of capital and thus interact
with the market indirectly, usually through their broker.
Since their orders are so small in relation to both the
value of total market transactions and the size of the
inventory of the executing broker-dealer, their orders are
often internalized (i.e. matched against the inventory of
their broker-dealer rather than finding a counter-party in
the lit market) [48]. For example, if investor A wishes to
sell 100 shares of AAPL at the market price to sell, it is
likely that, within a large brokerage, investor B wishes
to buy 100 shares of AAPL at the market price to buy;
these orders can then be executed at the midpoint of the
prices. Alternatively, the broker-dealer may choose to be
the counter-party to both traders, using its own invento-
ry of equities and capital.
Institutional investors represent an institution, such as
a large corporation, university, or state pension fund.
They are typically far more highly capitalized than a
retail investor, and thus their orders are likely to interact
more directly (whether through their brokerage or with
a market maker) with the NMS.
Brokerages execute orders on behalf of their clients.
They may do this by contacting market-makers, who will
execute trades on behalf of the brokerage, or they may
themselves be a market-maker or broker-dealer. Broker-
ages may enter into contracts with market-makers, who
agree to buy some percentage of the brokerage’s order
flow [49]. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
(the chief regulatory body of equity markets in the US)
regulation requires brokers to guarantee their clients the
“best execution” for their trades, which may include most
competitive price for their trades (i.e., highest possible
bid price and lowest possible offer price) [50]. As has been
previously identified elsewhere [51, 52], this regulatory
requirement for “Best Price” execution fails to consider
implications from special relativity [53]; namely, that it
is impossible to determine whether two distinct events
occur at the same time if those events are geographically
separated in space.
Market-makers are responsible for ensuring the mar-
ket’s liquidity. They quote a buy and sell price for a set
of traded assets at all times, and stand ready to buy or
sell an amount of those assets at their respective prices
[54]. Exchanges can establish designated market-makers,
who are responsible for“making the market” in a specific
asset[31].
a. Market centers
Exchanges in the NMS are privately-owned venues on
which securities are traded. They are extensively regulat-
ed by the SEC and are required by law to provide the best
possible execution price (under most circumstances) to
their customers [50, 55]. For each equity, each exchange
maintains a local order book that aggregates the orders
submitted by market participants. These local order
books contain information about resting limit orders,
updated by order flow, including the side (buy/sell), lim-
it price, size, and execution modifiers that give the mar-
ket participant greater control over how and when their
order is executed. Using their local book and proprietary
matching software, exchanges match buyers with sellers.
In 2016 there were 13 major stock exchanges:
a) NYSE (3): main exchange; ARCA, primarily for
trading exchange-traded funds (ETFs); and MKT,
the smallest of the NYSE family
b) NASDAQ (3): main exchange; BX, the Boston
stock exchange; and PSX, the Philadelphia stock
exchange
c) BATS (4): BATS and BATS Y; EDGX and EDGA.
These exchanges are now owned by CBOE, effective
early 2017.
d) IEX: the Investors Exchange, which was a ATS
until 17 June 2016
e) CHX: the Chicago stock exchange
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f) NSX: the National Stock Exchange and by far the
smallest stock exchange in terms of shares traded.
It has a long history of trading intermittently, with
pauses in operation of duration longer than a year.
Though each exchange keeps offices in its namesake city,
trading actually occurs (via each exchange’s matching
engine) in one of three data centers in northern New Jer-
sey; see Section III B.
ATSs, colloquially known as “dark pools”, are market
centers on which invited participants may trade equity
and other securities. While regulated by the SEC, ATSs
are not required to publish quotes and are subject to less
scrutiny than are the exchanges. ATSs are not required
to publish the location of their matching engine(s), and
as a rule their location is generally not known to the
public. Public SEC filings contain a location for each
registered ATS, though it may simply be an office and
not the location of the matching engine.
2. Regulatory mechanisms
The National Market System is regulated primarily
by the SEC. The equities industry also self-regulates
through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA), which charges itself with regulating member
brokerages and exchanges. While an authoritative insti-
tution, it does not have law enforcement power itself and
must refer suspected violations of securities law to the
SEC for enforcement. (FINRA has some ability to pro-
vide incentives and penalties to member organizations,
such as expulsion.) The Securities Information Processor
(SIP), mandated by SEC regulation, is a digital informa-
tion processor on which all quotes, trades, and admin-
istrative messages such as trading halts and limit-up /
limit-down (LULD) messages are recorded and through
which information can be disseminated to exchanges,
ATSs, and other market participants. The SIP constructs
the NBBO from this data, which forms the basis of the
notion of “best price” for the National Market system.
There are three SIP data collection “tapes”, two of which
(A and B) are located at the NYSE data center in Mah-
wah, NJ, and one of which (C) is located at the NASDAQ
data center in Carteret, NJ.
In addition to the SIP tapes mentioned above, there
are two FINRA-operated Trade Reporting Facilities
(TRFs), one each in Mahwah and Carteret. ATSs are
required to report trades to the TRFs, which in turn
report the trades to the correct SIP tape [56, 57].
Other regulatory machinery exists to prevent the
“overheating” of markets in the form of price changes
deemed excessive [58]. There are two types of these mech-
anisms: individual-stock limit-up, limit-down (LULD)
mechanisms and market-wide circuit-breakers. Individu-
al stock LULD mechanisms set price bands of 5%, 10%,
and 20% for each individual stock based on prices in
the immediate trailing five-minute trading period. If the
stock’s price exits the bands and does not return within
a fifteen second time period, a five-minute trading halt
for that stock is initiated. Similarly, market-wide circuit
breakers (set at 7%, 13%, and 20%) initiate halts in trad-
ing if the S&P 500 breaches these bands. A breach of the
first two levels results in a market-wide trading halt for
15 minutes, while a breach of the last band results in a
trading halt for the rest of the trading day.
Regulatory influence on the market is not limited to
price reporting and circuit-breaker mechanisms. Begin-
ning in 2016, the SEC instituted a live-market experi-
ment in which some securities would be quoted in mini-
mum increments greater than a penny (which is the cur-
rent minimum increment at which prices are quoted for
all stocks with a share price greater than $1.00) [59].
Known as the tick-size pilot program (or tick pilot), this
program directly alters the pricing mechanism and fun-
damental price quantization and thus may have an effect
on market dynamics.
Appendix B: Glossary and definitions
Market Architecture
Definition B.1 (Market System). A market system may
be defined as a network or graph which consists of a
set of one or more market centers connected by a set
of communication channels or (links), i.e. system =
(centers, links).
Definition B.2 (Market Center). A market center is a
location, physical or digital, where agents may interact
with a market system. A market center may be defined
as a tuple containing a local order book, a set of valid
actions, and a set of traded financial instruments, i.e.
center = (book, actions, instruments).
Definition B.3 (Local Order Book). The local order
book contains information about the unfulfilled orders that
have been submitted to a market center, allowing it to
accumulate and maintain state. One possible representa-
tion of a local order book for a single financial instrument
is two ordered lists of queues, where each list is associated
with a side of the marked (bid/offer) and each queue is
associated with a price.
Definition B.4 (Action Set). The action set defines the
valid actions at a market center. No requirements are
imposed on the action set, though a simple real world
action set might allow for the submission of limit orders
(which guarantee price), market orders (which guarantee
execution), modification of resting orders, and cancella-
tion of resting orders; i.e. actions = {limit order, market
order, modify, cancel}.
Definition B.5 (System Activity). Let the system activ-
ity, A, be a chronological list of all actions that are per-
formed in a market system. This includes actions per-
formed by market participants, administrative messages
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transmitted by regulators, and messages transmitted by
the exchange(s).
Definition B.6 (Data Feed). A data feed, D, is defined
to be any subset of the system activity of a market sys-
tem (i.e. D ⊆ A). Note that recorded occurrence times
of identical events may vary between distinct data feeds
due to physical considerations such as the finite speed of
information propagation, desynchronized clocks, etc.
Financial Instruments
Definition B.7 (Security). A security is a financial
instrument that represents partial or total ownership of
an object or entity. Securities are fungible; securities
belonging to the same “class” have the same value, and
therefore are interchangeable. Additionally, the exact val-
ue of a security is negotiable. Common varieties of secu-
rities include stocks, bonds, and options, all of which may
be traded on electronic markets, such as the NMS.
Definition B.8 (Stock). Stocks, which are also called
equities or equity securities, are a variety of security that
represents partial ownership of a publicly traded company.
Stocks are a vehicle by which companies can acquire the
capital necessary to grow and the secondary market for
stocks is the basis of a large portion of the U.S. financial
industry.
The Best Bid/Offer
The following definitions assume the existence of a
market system, system = (centers, links). Each
center ∈ centers has an action set that allows for limit
orders and trades a financial instrument i. Additional-
ly, there exists a data feed, D, that contains information
about the top of the book at each market center (i.e., a
consolidated quote feed).
Definition B.9 (Local Best Bid/Offer). The local best
bid and offer (LBBO) is a tuple composed of the local best
bid and the local best offer at a particular market center.
The local best bid for i at a particular center ∈ centers,
at a time, t, is given by the tuple (p, q), where p is the
maximum price among all active bids for i in the book
at center (as observed via data feed D) and q is the
quantity of shares of i available at that price at center
(i.e. LBB(D, center, i, t) = (p, q)). The local best offer
is defined similarly, but uses the minimum price among
active offers at center along with the number of shares
associated with that order (i.e. LBO(D, center, i, t) =
(p′, q′)).
Definition B.10 (Global Best Bid/Offer). The global
best bid and offer (GBBO) is a tuple composed of the
global best bid and the global best offer at a particular
market center.
The global best bid is similar to the local best bid, but is
formed by the maximum price (and the quantity associ-
ated with that order) among resting bids for i among all
market centers, i.e. GBB(D, i, t) = (p′′, q′′). Similar-
ly, the global best offer is formed by the minimum price
among resting offers and the number of shares at that
price (i.e. GBO(D, i, t) = (p′′′, q′′′)).
The NBBO, provided by the SIP, is an example of a
GBBO in the NMS. Note that any real implementation
of a GBBO necessitates the introduction of some amount
of latency from propagation delays between the market
centers and consolidating entity. This latency can have
material implications in electronic markets where infor-
mation propagation approaches the speed of light.
Market Inefficiencies
The following definitions assume the existence of a
market system, system = (centers, links), containing
two market centers, two data feeds, D1 and D2, and a
financial instrument i that is traded at each center ∈
centers. D1 and D2 are assumed to contain quote infor-
mation from each market center, though they may have
additional information that contributes to their unique-
ness. Additionally, the distribution of reporting latency
and timestamps associated with each event may differ
between the feeds.
Note that these definitions are phrased for the best bid,
but apply similarly to the best offer.
Definition B.11 (Price Discrepancy). A bid price dis-
crepancy is said to occur when the best bid price differs
between D1 and D2, i.e.
∆BB(i, t) = BB(D1, i, t).price−BB(D2, i, t).price 6= 0.
Definition B.12 (Market Inefficiency). A market inef-
ficiency occurs whenever a market participant is able to
systematically profit from a price discrepancy, usually via
the purchase and immediate sale of i.
Definition B.13 (Dislocated Data Feeds). D1 and D2
are dislocated with respect to the best bid of i at a time t
if there is a bid price discrepancy between D1 and D2.
Definition B.14 (Dislocation). A dislocation between
D1 and D2 occurs whenever they are dislocated with
respect to the best bid of i over a half-open interval of
time [a, b).
Definition B.15 (Differing trade). A trade is referred
to as a differing trade if it occurs during the lifetime of
a dislocation.
Definition B.16 (Dislocation Segment). A dislocation
segment with respect to the best bid of i is any half-open
interval of time, [a, b), where D1 and D2 are dislocated
with respect to the best bid of i and sgn(∆BB(i, t)) =
sgn(∆BB(i, a)) ∀t ∈ [a, b).
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Definition B.17 (Direction). The direction of a dis-
location segment over an interval [a, b) is defined as
sgn(∆BB(i, a)).
Definition B.18 (Duration). The duration of a dislo-
cation or dislocation segment over an interval [a, b) is
defined as b− a.
Definition B.19 (Magnitude). The magnitude of a dis-
location or dislocation segment over an interval [a, b) may
be defined as one of the following:
max mag = max
t∈[a,b)
{|∆BB(i, t)|}
min mag = min
t∈[a,b)
{|∆BB(i, t)|}
mean mag =
max mag +min mag
2
Definition B.20 (Realized Opportunity Cost). The
Realized Opportunity Cost (ROC) experienced by market
participants over a period of time [a, b] is defined as:∑
t∈T
|pD1(time(t), side(t))− pD2(time(t), side(t))|,
where T are all trades that occurred at the NBBO in
the period [a, b], time(t) is a function that returns the
time that trade t executed, side(·) returns the oppo-
site side (bid or offer) of the order that instigated the
trade, pD1(time, side) returns the best price displayed on
feed D1 at the given time and on the given side, and
pD2(time, side) provides the same information for feed
D2.
Market Actions
The following definitions provide a high-level descrip-
tion of the purpose and details of some common order
types, but are not necessarily representative of imple-
mentations at NMS market centers.
Definition B.21 (Limit Order). Guarantees market
participants an execution price no worse than a provid-
ed limit price, but does not provide any guarantees about
the timeliness of execution. This may be implemented by
placing a received limit order into the price queue asso-
ciated with the provided limit price on the correct side of
the book (bid or offer, as specified by the order), assum-
ing that it did not match with a resting order at a better
price.
Fields: Instrument identifier, bid/offer, limit price,
desired quantity.
Definition B.22 (Market order). Guarantees instant
execution on a best effort basis, but does not provide any
guarantees about the execution price. This may be imple-
mented by matching the market order with the best resting
orders on the opposite side of the book until the desired
quantity is obtained. A market order may be thought of
as a limit order with the limit price set in order to guar-
antee execution (i.e. 0 for a market offer or infinity for
a market bid).
Fields: Instrument identifier, bid/offer, desired quantity
Definition B.23 (Modify). Allows market participants
to update values associated with resting orders and allows
for adaptation to changing market conditions. The main
usage of this order is to change the number of shares
required to fulfill a particular order, since modifying the
limit price of order may cause it to lose its place in its
current price queue.
Fields: Order identifier, field(s) to modify, new value(s)
Definition B.24 (Cancel). Allows market participants
to remove resting orders from the local book prior to exe-
cution.
Fields: Order identifier
Definition B.25 (Immediate Or Cancel). Often short-
ened to IOC, this is a modifier which may be applied to
any order rather than a stand alone order type. The mod-
ifier indicates that the associated order should be executed
immediately upon receipt or canceled if immediate execu-
tion is not possible.
Definition B.26 (Non-Displayed Orders). Orders may
be marked with a conditional flag which indicates that
they should not be displayed on an exchanges order book,
in part or whole. Such orders are sometimes referred
to as hidden orders, since market participants can not
identify active non-displayed orders in an order book from
publicly available information.
Non-displayed orders may come with some negative
consequences including increased fees and decreased exe-
cution priority in comparison with displayed orders with
identical attributes.
Definition B.27 (Midpoint Peg). A variety of hidden
order that executes at the midpoint of the NBBO, i.e.
0.5(NBB.price+NBO.price).
Appendix C: Regulation National Market System
Regulation National Market System (Reg. NMS) is the
set of regulations which defines much of the macro-level
organization of the U.S. NMS. The primary goal of Reg.
NMS is the creation a unified National Stock Market,
additionally it has two secondary goals: to promote com-
petition between markets and between orders, and to
serve the interests of long-term investors and listing com-
panies [55]. Reg. NMS is composed of several rules and
regulations, the most important of which are summarized
below. See [55] for more details.
Order Protection Rule
The Order Protection Rule (Rule 611), also known
as the Trade-through Rule, is meant to protect orders
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from trade-throughs, which occur when a market cen-
ter matches an order against a local counter-party when
a better price is available via a protected quotation dis-
played by an alternative market center. Note that a “bet-
ter” price in this context is defined from the perspective
of the new order entering the market, a.k.a. a liquidi-
ty demanding or liquidity consuming order. Therefore a
lower execution price is be considered better for an enter-
ing bid (offer to buy), while a higher execution price is
be considered better for an entering offer (offer to sell).
A protected quotation is defined in Reg. NMS as a bid
or offer quotation that satisfies the following properties:
the quotation must be automated, the quotation must
be displayed by an automated trading center, and the
quotation must offer the lowest offer price or highest bid
price among all publicly displayed quotations.
A quotation is considered automated if it may be exe-
cuted without human intervention (up to the full listed
quantity), allows for the correct execution of Immediate-
Or-Cancel (IOC) orders against the quotation, immedi-
ately provides a response to the sender of an Immediate-
Or-Cancel order indicating the execution status of that
order, and immediately updates the quotation to reflect
any changes to its status.
A trading center is considered automated if it imple-
ments systems and procedures that allow it to display
automated quotations as defined above, and quotations
that do not satisfy the requirements of an automated
quotation are identified as manual quotations as quickly
as possible.
Trade-throughs are prohibited Under Rule 611, howev-
er exceptions are allowed for Inter-market Sweep Orders
(ISO), quotations displayed by markets that fail to meet
the reporting requirements for automated quotations,
and flickering quotations with multiple prices displayed
in a single second.
Access Rule
The Access Rule (Rule 610) concerns itself with setting
standards for access to quotations in NMS stocks, and
caps the fees that an exchange may charge for accessing
its protected quotations at $0.003 per share. Rule 610
allows for the creation and usage of private data feeds,
often referred to as direct feeds by market participants
since they are offered directly by exchanges rather than
through a third party. Rule 610 also prohibits trading
centers from displaying quotations which would lock or
cross a protected quotation from a different trading cen-
ter.
A market is said to be locked if the bid-offer spread of
that market is zero, in other words there exists a resting
bid and a resting offer with identical limit prices. A mar-
ket is said to be crossed if the bid-offer spread of that mar-
ket is negative, i.e. there exists a resting bid whose limit
price is greater than the limit price of a resting offer, or
equivalently a resting offer exists whose limit price is less
than the limit price of a resting bid. These effects are the
result of coupling geographically fragmented exchanges,
since an order that may lock or cross a market would
immediately find a counter-party if the two orders were
present on the same exchange.
Sub-Penny Rule
The Sub-Penny Rule (Rule 612) prohibits market par-
ticipants from displaying or accepting quotations for
NMS stocks priced in an increment less than $0.01 unless
the quotation price is less than $1.00, in which case the
minimum increment is $0.0001. Rule 612 is meant to
prohibit the practice of “sub-pennying” in which market
participants could “step ahead” of a protected quota-
tion by providing a negligible amount of price improve-
ment, allowing the “sub-pennied” order faster execution
at effectively no extra cost.
The significance of this rule, with respect to geographic
fragmentation and market inefficiencies, is that the min-
imum increment for the quoted price of a traded instru-
ment sets the minimum magnitude of all dislocation seg-
ments.
Market Data Rules
Rules 601 and 603 are referred to as Market Data
Rules and are meant to promote wide availability of mar-
ket data, thus providing all market participants with an
accurate and reliable source of information on the best
prices in NMS stocks. These rules cover the organization
of a consolidated data feed for NMS stocks, the reward
structure for contributing information to the consolidat-
ed data feed, and establishes standards for quote and
trade information provided to and provided by the con-
solidated data feed.
In particular these rules concern the Consolidated
Tape Association (CTA) plan which disseminates trans-
action information for NYSE listed securities, the Con-
solidated Quotation (CQ) plan which disseminates quote
information for NYSE listed securities, and the Nasdaq
UTP plan which disseminates quote and trade data for
Nasdaq listed securities. The information provided by
the CTA plan and CQ plan forms Consolidated Tape A,
and the information provided by the UTP plan forms
Consolidated Tape C. There also exists a Consolidated
Tape B which reports trade information for stocks listed
on regional exchanges. The aggregation of Consolidated
Tapes A, B, and C form what is commonly referred to as
the SIP feed.
©2018 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited Case 18-3190
22
Appendix D: Figures and Tables
Symbol Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
AAPL mean 174,820.85 2,542,188,952.00 34,316.58 483,265,898.89 45,852.81 0.007569
std 68,897.09 1,040,923,482.82 20,556.77 280,321,422.73 27,275.35 0.001224
min 54,824 983,856,430.54 2,112 35,009,317.38 2,773.35 0.004007
25% 129,830 1,872,512,861.35 23,498.75 340,459,129.85 32,088.96 0.007307
50% 156,198.50 2,272,037,106.11 32,741 452,246,993.35 43,204.10 0.007682
75% 199,793.25 2,870,019,105.28 42,674.75 599,146,631.96 57,647.05 0.008351
max 517,270 8,280,915,338.59 103,885 1,596,912,962.05 138,331.08 0.011924
AXP mean 32,348.46 250,614,304.97 9,086.69 71,464,081.61 11,622.14 0.008811
std 16,110.77 143,031,721.64 4,434.64 36,283,858.01 7,156.73 0.000757
min 11,095 90,438,986.65 2,219 19,241,382.52 2,666.91 0.007285
25% 22,756.50 168,209,590.34 5,999.50 49,149,197.52 7,672.38 0.008324
50% 26,835 207,178,850.49 7,476 57,481,058.84 8,987.37 0.008723
75% 37,067.75 277,456,051.09 10,905.75 86,485,488.61 13,792.36 0.009248
max 159,135 1,468,245,304.80 31,507 302,294,385.78 75,473.73 0.013393
BA mean 20,749.26 288,851,358.58 7,071.25 100,312,506.47 10,955.15 0.012812
std 10,435.29 154,859,396.19 3,027.87 41,626,820.43 6,235.13 0.008003
min 4,220 60,869,511.81 1,209 22,712,059.97 2,404.84 0.008497
25% 14,825.75 202,629,761.69 4,865 69,859,447.55 6,607.66 0.010588
50% 18,904 260,864,798.97 6,613.50 95,165,851.81 9,608.32 0.011730
75% 24,641.25 339,733,518.51 8,877.75 123,131,081.82 13,061.48 0.013252
max 101,159 1,496,951,020.26 19,630 303,000,376.46 47,010.92 0.131181
CAT mean 30,586.73 269,579,023.84 9,239.74 81,143,988.26 11,986.17 0.010142
std 11,384.23 107,296,519.47 3,721.88 30,953,831.34 8,988.83 0.005617
min 7,660 72,342,016.91 2,283 24,025,499.19 2,847.50 0.007044
25% 22,670.50 204,956,948.21 6,684.75 58,633,048.01 7,680.36 0.008842
50% 28,267 245,802,664.58 8,451 76,013,433.31 10,301.82 0.009394
75% 36,304.25 323,347,949.42 10,730 95,123,308.69 13,455.58 0.010105
max 77,886 964,799,514.35 22,381 222,261,612.89 100,244.92 0.084153
CSCO mean 77,364.30 493,693,519.98 11,555.12 74,134,548.33 26,409.30 0.008899
std 33,235.82 207,062,395.07 8,173.36 50,695,319.75 19,401.61 0.001000
min 31,865 182,535,557.30 660 4,502,758.25 1,461.77 0.005896
25% 58,015 367,489,467.23 6,881 46,381,850.87 15,394.81 0.008321
50% 68,328.50 444,190,912.86 10,643 70,264,638.23 23,922.43 0.009015
75% 86,368.50 548,980,902.84 14,364.50 92,558,544.11 32,439.85 0.009212
max 307,808 1,702,786,754.09 58,922 316,907,129.91 130,317.79 0.019144
CVX mean 44,441.79 462,460,384.39 12,439.81 134,648,014.78 17,036.07 0.012786
std 17,816.08 164,739,606.44 6,693.09 56,874,558.81 16,228.50 0.034249
min 13,879 144,582,207.22 2,377 28,830,654.89 2,456.15 0.006135
25% 32,594.50 346,722,417.91 8,344.75 97,784,127.50 9,772.81 0.008240
50% 39,655.50 430,819,298.93 10,794.50 122,659,276.18 12,993.21 0.008796
75% 53,123.50 538,846,282.98 14,257.25 158,567,573.75 18,798.64 0.009602
max 148,515 1,263,782,534.87 50,186 423,871,063.95 190,901.32 0.531465
DD mean 18,036.06 132,521,012.09 4,913.74 37,476,052.09 6,342.15 0.009882
std 8,759.67 63,295,360.33 2,764.13 19,045,796.05 4,403.69 0.004642
min 5,262 40,582,912.43 773 6,491,584.69 832.8600 0.004446
25% 12,017 89,557,470.32 3,123.50 24,611,595.27 3,912.60 0.008929
50% 15,462 114,690,819.55 4,104.50 32,687,710.05 5,066.52 0.009511
75% 20,793.50 155,332,165.60 5,499 44,016,133.46 7,243.21 0.010036
max 52,298 418,605,566.86 15,217 113,435,890.12 42,392.91 0.080300
DIS mean 41,156.78 495,392,306.10 10,535.97 129,495,234.75 39,331.64 0.024431
std 15,686.14 208,901,188.83 4,550.24 53,409,308.00 323,220.91 0.153256
min 17,030 203,854,389.74 2,633 36,156,641.31 3,221.94 0.006826
25% 31,892.25 374,803,933.38 7,657.50 97,517,442.34 10,284.53 0.008200
50% 36,745.50 430,039,189.49 9,220.50 114,691,273.09 13,055.17 0.008814
75% 45,623.25 558,118,900.42 11,989 144,599,501.14 17,818.25 0.010073
max 124,145 1,659,028,038.95 32,212 369,007,239.36 5,138,897.26 2.4261
GE mean 83,963.26 741,830,493.33 12,828.05 119,789,470.34 44,606.60 0.011460
std 35,661.52 309,010,418.40 8,012.21 69,234,760.11 71,027.27 0.009108
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Symbol Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
min 27,905 290,466,991.56 2,653 33,035,264.68 7,844.38 0.005032
25% 59,365.25 514,268,974.25 7,603 74,660,777.81 23,089.88 0.008105
50% 74,767.50 670,261,948.27 10,589 96,944,717.80 29,655.10 0.009088
75% 96,517 876,527,780.45 14,826 141,143,821.44 45,447.71 0.009994
max 236,395 1,961,985,442.37 49,675 427,596,291.36 1,020,533.87 0.074863
GS mean 16,072.52 266,630,735.82 6,039.60 100,455,871.70 12,632.51 0.018917
std 6,759.46 124,491,943.62 2,299.09 38,813,844.47 7,817.49 0.008519
min 5,914 106,821,197.38 1,908 43,864,040.44 4,126.93 0.009892
25% 11,672.50 178,117,450.68 4,400.50 72,797,279.72 8,094.88 0.015293
50% 14,285 224,601,809.66 5,593.50 89,806,560.53 10,478.40 0.017610
75% 18,995.50 329,800,789.60 7,207.25 123,468,835.06 14,081.00 0.020349
max 50,816 857,877,495.97 14,393 247,177,637.53 72,612.29 0.117195
HD mean 27,728.62 366,840,862.69 8,920.89 123,442,984.04 12,744.17 0.011027
std 8,963.39 127,799,636.38 3,551.59 45,816,593.86 13,953.86 0.005344
min 13,006 165,434,810.90 2,515 36,439,575.01 2,864.63 0.007334
25% 21,668.50 276,025,739.12 6,473 92,772,210.99 7,812.18 0.009211
50% 25,747 339,935,686.44 8,234 115,952,305.04 9,863.20 0.009837
75% 31,341.50 416,697,720.23 10,762 146,870,527.07 13,201.84 0.010717
max 64,114 1,031,531,952.92 22,597 291,592,154.20 186,403.78 0.059372
IBM mean 19,503.60 283,053,487.10 6,540.58 97,629,157.53 10,322.91 0.023045
std 7,762.60 121,204,978.80 3,031.09 41,935,403.95 11,852.61 0.155151
min 6,168 83,951,134.35 1,493 24,252,638 2,042.64 0.007853
25% 14,595 209,597,644.74 4,586 71,732,705.50 5,972.78 0.010419
50% 17,729 252,167,134.97 5,852.50 89,826,517.09 7,844.79 0.011260
75% 22,431.25 328,204,236.66 7,532.75 111,719,286.16 10,385.29 0.012460
max 59,625 972,131,459.03 21,810 299,050,973.50 111,628.46 2.4712
INTC mean 88,012.92 539,061,461.61 13,623.27 80,485,200.80 24,652.76 0.008581
std 32,133.18 218,280,102.40 8,604.73 50,349,950.02 16,048.53 0.001366
min 25,392 174,808,926.57 668 3,512,129.76 906.3800 0.003979
25% 66,319.50 409,452,090.75 8,564.50 53,076,046.07 15,370.02 0.008123
50% 81,767 493,100,646.52 13,526 79,046,604.94 23,962.08 0.008955
75% 100,219.25 601,791,580.25 17,608.50 104,796,930.94 32,243.13 0.009165
max 233,578 1,765,833,707.79 48,079 318,483,188.44 91,380.43 0.017641
JNJ mean 41,248.16 516,784,968.61 10,117.01 132,739,127.27 15,971.14 0.011066
std 13,010.19 163,195,302.28 4,751.53 54,033,725.20 24,562.10 0.009799
min 15,606 194,794,413.45 2,156 34,113,674.01 3,046.94 0.006887
25% 32,847.50 413,846,348.61 7,231.25 98,042,130.74 8,347.87 0.008033
50% 38,411.50 483,292,741.16 8,718 117,582,458.80 10,975.76 0.008545
75% 45,961.50 586,813,347.06 11,288 153,593,921.79 16,623.58 0.009356
max 94,603 1,244,615,527.23 32,165 338,562,051.69 362,771.34 0.091514
JPM mean 88,003.57 801,423,694.85 21,356.75 193,852,644.59 29,550.37 0.008671
std 39,466.22 360,958,601.04 11,483.72 91,730,373.77 14,749.77 0.001427
min 30,040 331,806,293.97 4,953 58,788,624.46 7,089.25 0.006291
25% 61,325.75 565,821,050.04 13,638 130,610,914.09 19,065.50 0.007994
50% 77,139 711,684,130.50 17,913.50 171,373,698.77 25,663.01 0.008471
75% 101,690.75 948,789,239.22 25,153 232,200,018.53 34,390.20 0.008981
max 256,973 3,004,137,079.38 70,052 646,651,792.53 92,386.71 0.019550
KO mean 52,120.74 406,264,869.51 10,086.25 81,371,474.40 18,263.90 0.009458
std 19,287.46 161,269,975.11 4,577.72 33,628,799.23 8,429.36 0.003791
min 19,958 185,384,176.07 3,156 30,732,830.23 7,111.74 0.006435
25% 39,138.50 301,353,437.57 7,209.25 59,076,462.53 13,153.95 0.008509
50% 47,536.50 368,857,020.57 8,995 74,612,460.50 16,482.05 0.008996
75% 58,796 463,324,316.41 11,326.50 92,283,870.91 20,688.83 0.009567
max 151,901 1,308,364,552.46 30,895 222,649,014.88 88,890.33 0.059954
MCD mean 28,809.30 380,847,318.26 7,442.77 103,499,997.57 10,822.55 0.010045
std 9,250.20 146,529,362.71 2,681.91 39,288,571.37 10,847.35 0.004427
min 9,911 117,553,924 2,479 32,522,381.94 2,926.51 0.007534
25% 22,526.25 277,305,454.74 5,422.50 75,412,153.02 6,484.23 0.008638
50% 26,999.50 355,968,666.10 7,088.50 98,050,825.62 8,795.32 0.009242
75% 33,173.25 455,898,847.39 8,601.50 121,862,623.83 11,289.40 0.009876
max 72,028 1,044,773,633.09 20,018 265,940,261.14 114,279.57 0.055288
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Symbol Trades Traded Val Diff Trades Diff Traded Val ROC ROC/Share
MMM mean 11,365.37 167,307,657.17 3,636.52 57,734,183.69 12,063.44 0.017206
std 3,901.98 56,357,516.03 1,769.07 23,315,655.68 102,963.80 0.055266
min 3,704 42,376,029.54 852 12,737,335.17 1,268.98 0.008572
25% 8,870.50 128,614,072.44 2,564 42,198,399.30 3,302.92 0.011656
50% 10,484 156,620,977.62 3,148 53,116,097.50 4,412.75 0.012771
75% 13,011 192,588,435.88 4,113 67,265,920.46 6,182.75 0.014374
max 27,168 374,180,512.59 11,339 141,420,561.60 1,638,916.42 0.888354
MRK mean 52,065.45 404,241,094.10 12,269.51 97,773,420.29 17,435.31 0.008974
std 21,247.82 198,964,179.96 6,450.80 49,864,763.12 10,578.05 0.002336
min 18,727 139,953,296.94 4,541 37,156,365.39 5,935.82 0.005243
25% 39,157.50 302,275,577.81 7,789 64,970,853.90 10,991.95 0.008151
50% 46,619.50 360,181,487.45 10,518 84,618,791.63 15,107.30 0.008574
75% 58,293.50 460,791,595.64 13,950.25 113,701,288.72 19,811.20 0.008998
max 232,717 2,584,131,245.57 46,595 456,348,016.09 112,089.37 0.027925
MSFT mean 141,856.07 1,190,901,402.50 24,761.04 203,129,267.74 36,706.48 0.008303
std 63,588.22 533,057,860.34 17,480.90 139,593,661.04 25,629.62 0.001006
min 37,036 459,917,664.02 1,070 8,596,209.02 1,253.33 0.004649
25% 102,602.75 837,915,412.53 14,050.50 122,690,779.06 22,117.84 0.007944
50% 124,327.50 1,053,837,918.53 22,263 180,976,495.62 32,474.83 0.008414
75% 156,482 1,373,674,878.44 32,070.75 262,037,990.81 48,649.14 0.008943
max 456,106 4,125,126,448 98,307 950,946,403.87 138,913.71 0.010702
NKE mean 46,386.10 377,535,172.78 10,935.36 89,164,054.37 18,227.11 0.009535
std 15,357.30 145,806,631.19 3,796.12 32,750,534.77 20,652.07 0.006259
min 13,818 84,721,641.01 2,885 18,676,669.13 3,523.46 0.005848
25% 37,737.50 295,226,871.17 8,613.25 69,144,244.49 12,031.69 0.008070
50% 42,544 344,601,219.52 9,822 80,592,736.50 14,390.93 0.008480
75% 51,532.50 424,862,753.77 12,534 102,100,476.22 18,212.90 0.008969
max 121,962 1,195,681,284.35 28,410 232,923,873.16 280,266.40 0.084753
PFE mean 91,040.68 692,324,391.87 13,862.73 110,715,986.10 31,625.70 0.009084
std 49,256.08 473,362,104.74 6,672.49 60,406,629.99 16,222.08 0.002189
min 32,599 212,898,806.65 4,422 28,855,501.39 8,447.34 0.005328
25% 59,097.50 426,001,630.46 9,726.75 74,658,424.30 21,093.39 0.008060
50% 80,628 611,356,656.02 13,270.50 103,824,254.59 29,745.09 0.008872
75% 109,044.50 783,454,707.50 16,379 129,458,335.77 36,810.46 0.009218
max 474,221 5,427,524,575.47 56,238 602,885,333.66 145,936.99 0.021475
PG mean 50,438.27 570,844,223.65 11,760.85 134,139,256.91 17,786.87 0.011319
std 26,464.80 419,733,122.26 5,828.25 70,501,433.31 13,441.76 0.027016
min 19,980 185,431,171.67 3,696 40,926,831.50 4,789.61 0.005871
25% 34,682.50 362,299,048 7,530.75 87,831,864.68 10,158.57 0.007830
50% 43,215.50 456,219,304.50 10,168.50 113,664,173.39 14,134.84 0.008337
75% 57,796 612,257,033.06 14,163 160,102,759.35 20,335.25 0.008869
max 181,697 3,330,428,860.98 38,467 460,594,145.16 111,040.42 0.427532
TRV mean 10,544.19 106,389,400.10 3,568.88 39,506,286.77 4,441.92 0.011206
std 3,416.58 36,241,051.32 1,447.62 15,393,415.99 2,794.22 0.002964
min 3,018 27,592,851.46 771 7,628,101.68 964.9800 0.007730
25% 8,487.25 82,492,360.44 2,705 29,702,903.75 2,990.61 0.009813
50% 9,965.50 101,071,670.21 3,334.50 37,475,398.81 3,837.38 0.010699
75% 12,010.25 122,831,584.80 4,172.25 46,650,233.97 4,933.57 0.011895
max 27,468 294,476,802.95 11,339 107,591,813.81 28,594.17 0.048296
UNH mean 17,446.67 228,660,097.56 5,642.65 77,377,042.02 7,680.73 0.011369
std 5,246.70 81,435,935.28 2,011.09 27,032,487.15 4,216.99 0.001956
min 6,412 89,234,548.68 1,849 26,225,274.13 2,378.89 0.008077
25% 14,129 173,512,633.11 4,413.50 59,089,553.72 5,357.03 0.010139
50% 16,636 214,637,619.41 5,371.50 75,046,042.50 6,539.35 0.010909
75% 19,932.50 260,900,529.94 6,717.75 92,546,473.56 8,912.00 0.012157
max 41,842 725,532,688.10 15,652 218,550,591.96 30,826.07 0.020873
UTX mean 24,903.26 263,375,122.23 8,217.23 88,158,366.16 17,510.92 0.011823
std 12,739.37 141,586,417.29 4,913.50 47,017,041.73 109,897.32 0.025491
min 5,358 49,595,310.95 1,315 13,549,323.03 1,579.70 0.007425
25% 16,977 182,655,118.69 4,942.75 59,862,917.81 6,260.83 0.009197
50% 21,463 229,710,235.45 7,034.50 77,766,133.91 8,629.70 0.009769
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75% 27,806.50 295,642,614.43 9,447.25 101,084,369.56 11,780.77 0.010558
max 86,284 1,144,629,181.20 29,297 275,444,139.17 1,749,683.12 0.413092
V mean 48,950.33 460,497,961.48 13,097.62 122,925,302.52 16,818.68 0.009524
std 17,793.66 170,963,876.45 6,162.95 50,951,708.77 9,603.52 0.007991
min 23,142 162,781,451.21 3,273 30,311,313.92 3,873.41 0.005686
25% 36,797 351,926,962.18 9,092.75 88,092,316.21 11,157.63 0.007977
50% 44,660 411,627,578.41 11,552 112,507,821.59 14,624.21 0.008478
75% 56,347 531,962,904.82 14,735 139,117,677.04 18,457.99 0.009089
max 128,775 1,261,830,529.49 42,661 355,125,487.75 85,584.79 0.120466
VZ mean 62,098.01 494,149,523.80 13,525.58 109,544,287.76 51,450.08 0.013465
std 23,339.73 185,520,474.01 5,963.55 44,308,281.09 427,124.11 0.030589
min 29,671 204,408,079.42 5,039 41,836,595.67 6,539.31 0.005940
25% 46,137.50 362,469,762.67 9,445.50 77,277,337.22 14,070.98 0.008312
50% 55,823.50 449,943,857.51 11,922 100,842,957.95 19,546.38 0.008925
75% 71,345 574,383,307.99 15,340.50 128,753,322.82 27,179.16 0.009833
max 147,919 1,264,130,771.03 36,340 266,067,716.19 6,798,041.07 0.469146
WMT mean 49,823.30 448,218,124.11 11,786.63 109,524,107.26 19,815.12 0.011010
std 20,042.63 187,614,765.33 5,642.63 49,138,231.17 26,412.77 0.013753
min 20,706 211,540,076.99 3,709 34,219,678.86 4,605.33 0.006303
25% 36,156.25 325,522,820.91 7,935 74,826,489.33 10,770.16 0.008199
50% 44,622.50 399,048,171.16 10,657 99,148,394.58 14,630.73 0.008728
75% 57,546.50 520,989,325.68 13,105.25 125,786,171.91 19,936.97 0.009294
max 156,021 1,562,166,750.41 36,698 361,429,655.92 246,675.56 0.176158
XOM mean 64,074.02 670,862,447.91 17,774.64 188,657,442.78 35,104.83 0.013337
std 28,483.97 265,569,760.30 10,924.37 93,450,720.08 127,162.28 0.021539
min 21,646 201,555,090.63 4,205 46,296,094.35 4,953.61 0.005362
25% 46,888 496,895,704.13 11,816.25 129,373,837.81 15,072.46 0.007813
50% 55,080.50 593,690,988.09 14,020 162,976,539.44 18,862.46 0.008369
75% 74,045.75 786,147,285.48 19,397.50 211,792,668.60 31,372.43 0.010116
max 209,816 1,761,362,028.61 75,421 613,405,517.24 2,003,841.58 0.238129
TABLE V: Summary ROC statistics for Dow 30 stocks, aggregated
by day and trading symbol.
Appendix E: Calculating realized opportunity cost
Calculating Realized Opportunity Cost (ROC) For
each trade of interest: Obtain the Securities Information
Processor (SIP) National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO)
prices and the Direct Best Bid and Offer (DBBO) at the
time of the trade. Check if the trade executed at one of
the NBBO prices. If yes, then the difference between
the execution price and the corresponding price from
the DBBO, multiplied by the number of shares transact-
ed, becomes the ROC associated with that trade. Note:
Depending on the side of the active order (bid or offer),
and the relationship between the NBBO and DBBO, the
ROC may be identified as favoring the SIP or a Direct
feed. In other words, when the active order could receive
price improvement by executing at the price displayed by
the DBBO, then the ROC becomes associated with the
SIP (SIP ROC). Likewise, if the active order received
a price improvement by executing at the NBBO rather
than the DBBO, then the ROC becomes associated with
the Direct feeds (Direct ROC). If no, then the trade is dis-
carded from the analysis, since it is difficult to accurately
determine the side of the active order in this situationand
knowing the side of the active order is required in order
to accurately calculate the directional ROC. Note: ROC
experienced on both sides of the book (bid and offer)
are aggregated over each day, ticker, and exchange; thus,
there may be some cancellation between positive ROC
(Direct ROC) and negative ROC (SIP ROC) during the
aggregation to determine net ROC for that day-ticker-
exchange. The net ROC is therefore a conservative mea-
sure, since it is possible that investors could experience
both SIP and Direct ROC for that day-ticker-exchange.
Example: In particular, see the 79th trade in Table
VII, where 100 shares of AAPL transacted at $99.13
at 9:48:55.398386. The NBBO at that time was (bid
@ $99.13, offer @ $99.15), while the DBBO was (bid
@ $99.16, offer @ $99.17). Since the trade executed
at $99.13, the best bid displayed by the SIP, we infer
that the resting order was a bid and the active order
was an offer. The ROC is then calculated as ($99.13
per share - $99.16 per share) * 100 shares = (-$0.03 per
share) * 100 shares = -$3.00 in favor of the Direct feeds
(i.e. SIP ROC). From this example, one can note that
when the active order is an offer, then the formula for
ROC is (SIP National Best Bid (NBB) - Direct Best
Bid (DBB)) * shares. This results in a positive value
when the NBO provides price improvement for the active
bid and a negative value when the DBO provides price
improvement for the active bid. Additionally, see the
95th trade in Table VII where 100 shares transacted at
$99.14 at 9:48:55.398560. The NBBO at that time was
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FIG. 11. Daily ROC during calendar year 2016 aggregated across all tickers. A large majority of days favored the direct data
feeds. Both Direct and SIP ROC time series show signs of decay across 2016, which may be due to infrastructure improvements.
(bid @ $99.14, offer @ $99.14) and the DBBO was (bid
@ $99.16, offer @ $99.17). Since the SIP was locked at
the time of execution the active order could have been
from either side of the book. For this example, we will
focus on the situation where we assume the active order
is a bid and the resting order is an offer. The ROC is
then calculated as ($99.17 per share - $99.14 per share)
* 100 shares = ($0.03 per share) * 100 shares = $3.00
in favor of the SIP (i.e. Direct ROC). Note that in this
example, the formula used to calculate the ROC reverses
the position of the SIP and Direct prices since the active
order is a bid instead of an offer. Thus, the formula
for ROC is (Direct Best Offer (DBO) - SIP Best Offer
(NBO)) * shares. This maintains the meaning of the
sign, where positive values indicate price improvement
featured by the NBB and negative values indicate price
improvement featured by the DBB (from the perspective
of the active order). Thus, ROC from both sides of the
book may be treated uniformly in that positive values
favor the SIP feed and negative values favor the consol-
idated Direct feeds. We aggregate the ROC by date,
stock, and venue. Since these two trades occurred at the
same trading venue, they would be summed, resulting in
a net ROC of $0.00. Similar cancellations occur for every
date-stock-venue combination resulting in these conser-
vative measures of ROC. Additionally, in the example
dislocation there were almost 100 differing trades (i.e.,
trades that occurred while the NBBO and DBBO are
dislocated) as contained in Table VII. Yet, our ROC mea-
sures only include trade executions at the NBBO. There-
fore, we only consider a total of 11 trades (6 on the offer
and 5 on the bid) during this dislocation, thus providing
additional evidence that our ROC measures are conser-
vative.
Dislocations and Dislocation Segments: In Fig. 7, we
see all dislocations in AAPL on January 7, 2016. We
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Direct Feed and Historical Data Pricing
Data Provider Product One-time Cost Monthly Fee
CTA CQS/CTS Feed $1,850
UTP UQDF/UTDF Feed *$2,500
NYSE Integrated Feed $7,500
Historical DoB $60,000
Historical ToB $36,000
NYSE ARCA Integrated Feed $3,000
Historical DoB $36,000
NYSE MKT Integrated Feed $2,500
(Now NYSE American) Historical DoB $18,000
National Stock Exchange NSX Integrated Feed $0
(Now NYSE National) Historical DoB **$1,500
NASDAQ TotalView-ITCH Feed *$25,000
Historical DoB *$1,250
NASDAQ BX TotalView-ITCH Feed *$20,000
Historical DoB *$500
NASDAQ PSX TotalView-ITCH Feed *$17,000
Historical DoB *$500
BATS BZX Depth Feed $2,000
Historical DoB $8,500
BATS BYX Depth Feed $2,000
Historical DoB $8,500
Direct Edge EDGA Depth Feed $1,000
Historical DoB $8,500
Direct Edge EDGX Depth Feed $2,000
Historical DoB $8,500
The Investors Exchange TOPS Feed $0 $0
DEEP Feed $0 $0
Historical DoB $0 $0
Chicago Stock Exchange CHX Book Feed $0 $0
(Now NYSE Chicago) Historical DoB
Total $184,000 $90,100
TABLE VI. The pricing presented in this table assumes a single consumer with an academic use case aiming to construct a
dataset similar to what was used in this analysis. It is also assumed that non-display fees do not apply. Historical data costs
assume a 12 month period of interest, i.e. calendar year 2016. Strictly speaking, historical data may sufficient for replicating
the analysis presented in this paper, making subscription to live feeds unnecessary. However, utilizing historical data provided
by each exchange excludes the possibility of collecting data from a single point of observation, reintroducing the issues of
clock synchronization and relativity. Additionally, highlighting the monthly cost for comprehensive direct feed access shines a
light on one of the reasons for the lack of academic participation in the analysis of modern U.S. stock markets. This does not
include costs which may be incurred while curating the data, fulfilling potential co-location requirements, ISP/networking costs,
computing hardware acquisition and maintenance, etc. DoB indicates that a product contains full Depth of Book information
(adds, mod, and cancel messages), while ToB indicates that a product contains only Top of Book information (trade and quote
messages). The NYSE Historical ToB product, also called NYSE Daily TAQ, is frequently used in academic studies due to
it’s relatively low cost and broad coverage (e.g. [24] use this product). Historical data from CHX is not directly available, and
the live feeds are transitioning to NYSE technology, thus historical CHX data must be purchased from a third party. This
list is not guaranteed to be comprehensive, additional fees/costs may exist. *Access to UTP data and NASDAQ direct feed
data may granted freely to academic institutions, see UTP Feed Pricing and NASDAQ Academic Waiver Policy for more info.
**Historical data purchased from NYSE only covers 5/21/2018 - present for NYSE National, thus an alternative data provider
is required in order to obtain historical data from 2016. The sources used to construct this table include CTA feed pricing,
UTP feed pricing via the Data Policies document, NYSE feed pricing, NYSE historical data pricing, NASDAQ feed pricing,
BATS/DirectEdge feed pricing, and CHX feed pricing
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select an arbitrary dislocation to investigate which exist-
ed on the offer side from 9:48:55.396886 to 9:48:55.398749
(a duration of 1863 microseconds). This dislocation fea-
tures a maximum value of $0.06, which occurs between
9:48:55.397644 and 9:48:55.398027 (a duration of 383
microseconds or 20.56% of its lifetime). During this time
where the dislocation featured its maximum value, the
SIP best offer remained at $99.11 and the Direct best
offer remained at $99.17. Thus, any bid orders submit-
ted during this period stood to save $0.06 per share by
transacting at the SIP BO rather than the Direct BO,
assuming that they could actually locate resting offers at
$99.11, either in the lit or dark markets. Note that this
dislocation started and ended while the Limit-up Limit-
down (LULD) mechanism was in effect (this is engaged at
9:45 each day, following the first 15 minutes of trading),
featured a duration longer than 545 microseconds (what
we consider to be the minimum duration in order to be
actionable) and featured a maximum magnitude greater
than $0.01. Note: you can find more info on LULD here:
http://www.luldplan.com/index.html.
Connecting Realized Opportunity Cost and Disloca-
tion Segments: The ROC statistic captures events that
occurred (i.e. trades) and assigns an opportunity cost
to them based on the state of the SIP and Direct feeds
at the time of the trade. Hopefully the above exam-
ple has illustrated the extreme sparsity of our ROC
approach, which only considers trades that execute at
either side of the prevailing NBBO, features cancellation
effects due to aggregation, and does not consider dura-
tion/actionability (e.g., could the agent who entered the
active order have reasonably reacted to the state of the
two feeds?). Dislocation segments are constructed to cap-
ture the relative states between the NBBO and DBBO
through time, observing the dislocations between the two
feeds and collecting information about their duration and
magnitude. With our approach, we capture the inef-
ficiencies and opportunity costs that actually occurred
(i.e., realized), and what inefficiencies and opportunity
costs could have occurred (i.e., dislocation segments).
For illustrative purposes only, if the NBBO and DBBO
were tightly synchronized, then the ROC statistic would
tend towards $0.00. [Note: there are specific policy rea-
sons in Reg. NMS that SIP reporting will always lag
reporting on the direct feeds, independent of technologi-
cal infrastructure]. Thus, constructing DSs so that they
only consider the NBBO and DBBO allows us to isolate
one component of the ROC statistic and investigate it
in greater detail. Additionally, the ROC statistic does
not account for duration/actionability, while DSs allow
for such considerations of duration / actionability to be
addressed in a simple and direct way. These two mea-
surements, ROC and DSs, were constructed to investi-
gate similar phenomena from slightly different perspec-
tives to provide complementary and synergistic views of
NMS dynamics.
Index Thesys Timestamp Delta Symbol Size Price Exchange Extra
0 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396951 255 AAPL 100 99.11 1 -651
1 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396951 227 AAPL 100 99.12 1 -651
2 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396978 237 AAPL 100 99.12 1 -678
3 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396978 222 AAPL 100 99.12 1 -678
4 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396978 204 AAPL 100 99.13 2 -852
5 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396998 207 AAPL 100 99.13 2 -872
6 2016-01-07 09:48:55.396998 190 AAPL 100 99.13 2 -872
7 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397064 239 AAPL 100 99.13 2 -938
8 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397064 216 AAPL 100 99.12 1 -764
9 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397068 204 AAPL 50 99.13 2 -942
10 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397196 316 AAPL 200 99.13 2 -1070
11 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397196 296 AAPL 100 99.16 1 -1013
12 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397196 279 AAPL 100 99.13 2 -1070
13 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397196 262 AAPL 395 99.11 3 -1044
14 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397297 344 AAPL 100 99.13 1 -997
15 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397297 327 AAPL 100 99.16 4 -1114
16 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397297 309 AAPL 100 99.13 1 -997
17 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397297 292 AAPL 100 99.14 2 -1171
18 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397297 275 AAPL 100 99.13 1 -997
19 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397297 259 AAPL 100 99.12 3 -1145
20 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397361 306 AAPL 100 99.14 2 -1235
21 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397431 358 AAPL 100 99.13 3 -1279
22 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397431 317 AAPL 100 99.14 2 -1305
23 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397431 298 AAPL 100 99.13 1 -1131
24 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397431 268 AAPL 100 99.13 3 -1279
25 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397499 316 AAPL 50 99.13 1 -1199
26 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397499 299 AAPL 100 99.13 3 -1347
Continued on next page
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Index Thesys Timestamp Delta Symbol Size Price Exchange Extra
27 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397499 284 AAPL 100 99.13 1 -1199
28 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397504 272 AAPL 100 99.14 2 -1378
29 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397504 255 AAPL 100 99.13 1 -1204
30 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397565 299 AAPL 50 99.13 3 -1413
31 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397565 281 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1265
32 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397565 266 AAPL 200 99.13 3 -1413
33 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397604 290 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1304
34 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397604 276 AAPL 100 99.13 3 -1452
35 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397604 260 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1304
36 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397685 325 AAPL 100 99.14 3 -1533
37 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397685 309 AAPL 100 99.14 3 -1533
38 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397685 293 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1385
39 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397731 323 AAPL 100 99.14 3 -1579
40 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397731 309 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1431
41 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397731 294 AAPL 100 99.14 3 -1579
42 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397731 279 AAPL 50 99.15 1 -1431
43 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397767 300 AAPL 100 99.14 3 -1615
44 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397767 285 AAPL 100 99.14 3 -1615
45 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397767 269 AAPL 900 99.15 3 -1615
46 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397824 310 AAPL 100 99.15 1 -1524
47 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397824 294 AAPL 100 99.15 3 -1672
48 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397824 280 AAPL 100 99.14 2 -1698
49 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397824 266 AAPL 100 99.15 2 -1698
50 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397870 298 AAPL 100 99.15 2 -1744
51 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397870 282 AAPL 100 99.15 1 -1570
52 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397894 290 AAPL 100 99.15 3 -1742
53 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397894 275 AAPL 100 99.15 1 -1594
54 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397894 260 AAPL 50 99.15 3 -1742
55 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397973 323 AAPL 50 99.15 1 -1673
56 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397973 307 AAPL 100 99.15 3 -1821
57 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397973 293 AAPL 100 99.15 1 -1673
58 2016-01-07 09:48:55.397994 299 AAPL 50 99.15 2 -1868
59 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398058 346 AAPL 50 99.16 1 -1758
60 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398058 331 AAPL 200 99.15 3 -1906
61 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398058 313 AAPL 100 99.16 1 -1758
62 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398125 366 AAPL 100 99.15 2 -1999
63 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398128 354 AAPL 100 99.15 3 -1976
64 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398147 357 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1422
65 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398147 342 AAPL 200 99.15 2 -2021
66 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398158 339 AAPL 100 99.16 3 -2006
67 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398177 342 AAPL 100 99.15 2 -2051
68 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398225 375 AAPL 100 99.16 3 -2073
69 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398225 359 AAPL 5 99.16 3 -2073
70 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398225 345 AAPL 100 99.14 1 -1500
71 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398267 373 AAPL 100 99.15 1 -1542
72 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398267 358 AAPL 100 99.16 1 -1542
73 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398267 342 AAPL 100 99.17 1 -1542
74 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398267 327 AAPL 100 99.17 1 -1542
75 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398267 312 AAPL 50 99.17 1 -1542
76 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398272 300 AAPL 400 99.11 5 -1967
77 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398272 285 AAPL 100 99.12 5 -1967
78 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398386 384 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2081
79 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398414 397 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2109
80 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398414 381 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2109
81 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398414 365 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2109
Continued on next page
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Index Thesys Timestamp Delta Symbol Size Price Exchange Extra
82 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398444 381 AAPL 50 99.13 5 -2139
83 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398444 366 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2139
84 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398444 352 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2139
85 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398444 337 AAPL 100 99.13 5 -2139
86 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398444 322 AAPL 100 99.14 5 -2139
87 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398532 395 AAPL 50 99.14 5 -2227
88 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398532 369 AAPL 100 99.15 2 -1507
89 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398532 354 AAPL 100 99.16 2 -1507
90 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398537 344 AAPL 50 99.17 2 -1512
91 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398537 330 AAPL 100 99.17 2 -1512
92 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398560 339 AAPL 100 99.17 2 -1535
93 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398560 324 AAPL 50 99.17 3 -1282
94 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398560 309 AAPL 100 99.14 5 -1434
95 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398571 305 AAPL 50 99.15 5 -1445
96 2016-01-07 09:48:55.398571 291 AAPL 100 99.15 5 -1445
TABLE VII: Trades that occurred during a dislocation in AAPL on
2016-01-07 at approximately 9:48am, more than three minutes after
the trading “guardrails” are enforced. The “Delta” column indicates
the difference between the Thesys timestamp and the SIP publication
timestamp (in microseconds). For trade 0, Thesys received the trade at
9:48:55.396951 and the SIP timestamp was 9:48:55.396696. The “Extra”
column contains additional deltas related to the timestamps added in the
2015 SIP changes, see [24] for additional details. In particular, this col-
umn contains the difference (in microseconds) between the Thesys times-
tamp and the exchange timestamp. For trade 0, Thesys received the
trade at 9:48:55.396951 and the exchange timestamp was 9:48:55.397602,
an example of the timestamp inversion seen in [24], which is generally
cause by clock synchronization issues.
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timestamp Exchange number price shares direct bid direct ask sip bid sip ask roc
2016-01-07 09:48:55.396951 1 99.11 100 99.14 99.14 99.10 99.11 3.0
2016-01-07 09:48:55.397196 3 99.11 395 99.14 99.15 99.10 99.11 15.8
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398147 1 99.14 100 99.16 99.17 99.12 99.14 3.0
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398225 3 99.14 100 99.16 99.17 99.12 99.14 3.0
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398532 2 99.15 100 99.16 99.17 99.14 99.15 2.0
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398560 5 99.14 100 99.16 99.17 99.14 99.14 3.0
TABLE VIII. A subset of the trades from Table VII that resulted in positive ROC. Positive ROC indicates that these trades
received favorable prices that were aligned with the SIP NBBO.
timestamp Exchange number price shares direct bid direct ask sip bid sip ask roc
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398272 5 99.12 100 99.16 99.17 99.12 99.14 -4
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398386 5 99.13 100 99.16 99.17 99.13 99.15 -3
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398444 5 99.14 100 99.16 99.17 99.14 99.15 -2
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398532 5 99.14 50 99.16 99.17 99.14 99.15 -1
2016-01-07 09:48:55.398560 5 99.14 100 99.16 99.17 99.14 99.14 -2
TABLE IX. A subset of the trades from Table VII that resulted in negative ROC. Negative ROC indicates that these trades
executed at less favorable prices than what was offered by the DBBO.
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